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Bank regulation used to be riddled with price, product, entry, and location
restrictions. Such restrictions were intended to prevent the recurrence of crises,
such as those of the 1930s and 1940s. Over time, however, regulatory
acquiescence to technological and institutional innovation undermined their
ability to limit competition. An intellectual turn toward valorizing competition
also hastened their demise. George Stigler, in particular, provided a trenchant
critique of all such regulation as the product of pure rent seeking by private
industry.
This Article revisits the role ofsuch restrictions on competition in banking.
On the one hand, the public choice account of these restrictions as the outcome
of private rent seeking is essentially true. On the other hand, their unintended
historical result was to limit banks' risk-taking incentives and to coopt banks
into preventing regulatory arbitrage. Viewed from this perspective, these
restrictions provide an important legal, political, and economic (LPE) modelfor
how limits on competition could usefully complement current bank regulation.
This model is one in which, to some extent, regulation facilitates rather than
frustrates cartel formation in order to maintain a more stable equilibrium.
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The state has one basic resource which in pure principle is not shared with
even the mightiest of its citizens; the power to coerce. . . . These powers provide
the possibilities for the utilization of the state by an industriy to increase its
profitability.' - George Stigler (1971)
Many of the key events in the recent financial crisis resembled an old-
fashioned bank run.' Investors in the short-term debt of major financial
institutions feared their large exposures to bad mortgage loans. As a result, they
refused to roll over the debt and took refuge in the safety of government bonds.3
Even fundamentally solvent institutions were threatened by this loss of short
term funding or liquidity.4 The end result was a large-scale contraction in the
supply of credit a "credit crunch"-that helped to cause and prolong a deep
economic recession.5 The immediate economic consequences of these events
were dire, and their political and legal consequences are still unfolding.
These events would seem very familiar to a nineteenth-century observer of
U. S. banking. Major banking panics occurred at least once per decade throughout
most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and many were preceded
by widespread real estate speculation.6 These recurring panics commanded
1 . George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCE. 3, 4(1971).
2. See GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (20 10)
(arguing that the panic of 2007 should be viewed as a banking panic)
3. See Bryan Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Flight to Safety and US. Treasury Securities,
REGIONAL ECONOMIST 18 (2010), http://www.stlouisfed.org/-/ media/Files/PDFs/publications
/pubps assets/pdf/re/2010/c/treasury securities.pdf [http://perma.cc/2KBK-2Y32]
4. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 200 7-2008,
23 J. ECON. PFRSP. 90 (2009).
5. Id. (describing the dynamics of a credit crunch).
6. Charles Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts,
and Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 199 1).
From the War of 1812 to the eve of World War I in 1914, the United States experienced at least ten
episodes involving large-scale suspensions of payment by banks to their depositors. For a comprehensive
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popular attention and triggered a number of legislative responses. The National
Bank Act of 1864 created a national currency, a national banking system, and a
national regulator (the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) to oversee the
system.' The Federal Reserve Act of 1914 created a central bank with the ability
to lend to member banks.8 Many states set up their own deposit insurance
schemes.9 But these efforts were not successful in limiting the incidence of
panics, and the 1930s witnessed the greatest financial crisis in the history of the
United States.
Remarkably, in the decades after the Great Depression there were no large-
scale banking crises in the United States.'o This period coincided with the
creation of a distinct legal and regulatory system to govern banking. The New
Deal system was created through a flurry of Depression-era legislation. It was
characterized by a few key features: (1) access to central bank lending, (2)
deposit insurance, (3) examination and regulation of bank assets and liabilities,
(4) price controls on deposit interest rates, (5) product restrictions that separated
commercial and investment banking, and (6) entry and location restrictions on
bank expansion. Taken together, these provisions reflected a view that bank
competition, if left unregulated, would lead to socially unacceptable levels of
risk taking and crises.
History has not been equally kind to the components of this system. Central
bank lending, deposit insurance, and supervision continue to play an essential
role in federal bank regulation, but the price, product, entry, and location
restrictions that were a hallmark of New Deal bank regulation are largely a relic
of the past. The Deposit Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 phased out interest-rate ceilings on all bank accounts other than demand
deposits," the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994 permitted nation-wide branching,12  and the Financial Services
Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999 revised sections of the Glass-
Steagall Act to allow banks, broker-dealers, and insurance companies to affiliate
with one another through a financial holding company structure.13
In each of these instances, the act of deregulation was more a consequence
of changes in banking markets than a cause of it. Long before the recent financial
historical account of the role that law and legal institutions have played in financial crashes, see ERIK
GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014).
7. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 7, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
8. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (2018))
9. Charles Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50 J.
ECON. HIST. 283 (1990).
10. See GORTON, supra note 2 at 14.
11. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).
12. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections 12
U.S.C.).
13. Pub. L. No 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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crisis and the concerned discussions of the "shadow banking" system that
followed, informed observers were aware that the forces of competition were
moving banking activity outside of deposit-taking institutions.'4 These
developments rendered the price, product, entry, and location restrictions on
banks increasingly obsolete.'5 Money market funds and Eurodollar accounts
competed with bank deposits, non-bank lenders were free to operate nationally,
and capital markets provided an increasing share of the debt financing that had
been the historical preserve of commercial banks.'6 As a result of these
developments, many institutional aspects of the recent crisis would have been
quite unfamiliar to architects of the New Deal system.
This reappearance of banking panics in a new institutional guise poses a
difficult set of questions for bank regulation. Before the crisis, it was known that
institutions such as broker-dealers, special purpose securitization vehicles, and
money market funds were part of the broader banking system." It was also
known that the short-term debt issued by such institutions-repurchase
agreements, asset-backed commercial paper, and money market shares were
important substitutes for bank deposits." But for almost all observers, the crisis
revealed that these markets are much more vulnerable to banking panics than
was previously thought and that such panics can spill over in a number of ways
to the more traditional banking system.
It is therefore tempting to look back on the "quiet period" that followed the
Great Depression and the regulatory system that accompanied it-for
answers.'9 If bank regulation played an important role in maintaining this
stability, it follows that deregulation could have undermined it. This temptation
is best illustrated in calls to reintroduce the separation of commercial and
investment banking associated with the Glass-Steagall Act.20 Yet, this Glass-
14. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future
ofBank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237 (1992) (discussing the growth of deposit substitutes such as
repurchase agreements, money market funds, and Eurodollar accounts).
15. Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation ofBanks andBank Holding Companies, 73
VA. L. REV. 304 (1987).
16. Id.
17. See Gary Gorton, Money Market Funds and Finance Companies: Are They the
Banks of the Future?, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN BANKING (Michael Klausner & Lawrence White eds.,
1993) (arguing that money market funds and finance companies perform important banking functions);
Gary Gorton & Nicholas Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11190, 2005) (arguing that special purpose vehicles for securitization serve
important banking functions).
18. Macey & Miller, supra note 14 at 237.
19. For a comprehensive account of the definition and evolution of bank holding
companies from this period to the present, see Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We
Call a Bank: Revisiting the History ofBank Holding Company Regulation in the United States, 31 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 113-198 (2011).
20. A small, yet prominent group of politicians from across the political spectrum-
including Senators Elizabeth Warren, Bernie Sanders, and John McCain have voiced support for such an
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Steagall revivalism has attracted little enthusiasm in the academic and policy
community.2
In fact, the broader thesis that financial deregulation was responsible for
the financial crisis has also faced notable criticism. In a comprehensive, recent
account, Paul Mahoney argues persuasively that there is no simple and direct
relationship between recent statutory changes and the specific activities that led
to the financial crisis.22 The financial institutions that were responsible for the
crisis were broadly authorized to carry out all of these activities for decades
preceding it. Mahoney argues further that the quiet period in banking from the
Great Depression to the 1970s and its subsequent unraveling had little to do with
regulation or deregulation. Mahoney instead attributes this pattern of calm
followed by turbulence to broader economic forces that were channeled through
interest rates.23
Does this imply that there is nothing to be learned from New Deal
regulation and its role in the quiet period of U.S. banking history? In this Article,
I suggest that such a conclusion would be premature. The history of price,
product, entry and location restrictions, of which the Glass-Steagall Act was but
one part, provides important lessons for contemporary regulation. Perhaps
paradoxically, these lessons are best seen by starting with George Stigler's
observation, "as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and
operated primarily for its benefit."24 The competitive restrictions in New Deal
bank regulation can be described as a textbook illustration of industry rent
seeking and capture and, by implication, Stigler's "public choice" view of
regulation.25
I suggest that, in addition, the rents created through these restrictions also
helped to solve two problems that are central to contemporary bank regulation.
First, they lowered the incentives of banks to take excessive risk and, crucially,
did so without requiring regulators to precisely monitor risk-taking activities.26
21. Its critics have raised a number of important objections. The financial crisis arose
in a very traditional area of banking mortgage lending-and its effects were spread across many types
of financial institutions.
22. Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, VA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2957801 [http://perma.cc/7YG9-8SBK].
Mahoney analyzes the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999, which repealed parts of the Glass-Steagall Act
and the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which largely blessed the set of existing
practices concerning over-the-counter derivatives.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Stigler, supra note 1, at 3; see also Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 335 (1974) (discussing the power and limitations of this view
of regulation); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory ofRegulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976)
(discussing the same).
25. See Charles Calomiris, The Political Lessons of Depression-Era Banking Reform,
26 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 540 (2010); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups
Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1 (1984) (applying
these insights to analyze the Depression era legislation and its legal interpretation).
26. The view that rents can lower bank risk taking, while far from universally accepted,
is consistent with a body of theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between competition
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Second, they created incentives for banks to prevent banking activity from
moving outside the regulated banking system. I summarize how the legal,
political and economic (LPE) architecture of this system created the incentives,
monitoring capability, and enforcement authority to achieve these ends. More
generally, I explain how the theory of oligopoly, a mainstay of public choice
critiques of regulation, can sometimes help to explain its effectiveness.27
I conclude by outlining one model, among many possible ones, that seeks
to apply these past insights to the present. In this model, prudential regulation
operates so as to limit the amount of panic-prone debt that could be issued by
bank holding companies. Regulation simultaneously extends to non-bank
financial companies so as to even further limit their issuance of such debt or its
close substitutes. This model creates a framework of privileges and prohibitions
that limits the aggregate quantity of such debt and concentrates it in the regulated
banking sector.28 The effect is to raise the price of panic-prone debt and lower
its yield, creating a rent or funding advantage for regulated banks. The use of
regulation to affect prices in this market is no different in kind than Federal
Reserve policy to affect short-term interest rates in the pursuit of monetary
policy.29 However, it has the additional effect of limiting bank incentives for risk
taking to preserve a utility model of safe returns, while enlisting banks to protect
this privilege by aiding regulators in their enforcement against nonbanks.
The rest of Article is organized as follows. Part I explains what I call the
orthodox view of bank regulation and how it gives rise to problems of risk
and stability in banking. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Competition and Financial Stability,
36 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 453 (2004); Elena Carletti, Competition and Regulation in Banking,
in HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND BANKING 449 (Anjan V. Thakor & Arnoud W.A.
Boot eds., 2008); XAVIERVIVES, COMPETITION AND STABILITY IN BANKING: THE ROLE OF REGULATION
AND COMPETITION POLICY (2016) (explaining the economic theory and evidence for and against this
view).
27. For a different account of how to think about the role of state power in financial
regulation, see Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
1143 (2017). In contrast to Hockett and Omarova, the notion of rent I employ does not inevitably follow
from the grant of a government franchise. In particular, an open-franchise policy in a competitive setting
may not generate rents for franchisees.
28. For another approach to how banking regulation could utilize privileges and
prohibitions, see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016).
In contrast to Ricks, the approach I describe requires neither explicit government insurance of all short-
term debt (money-like claims) nor an absolute prohibition on all such instruments outside the regulated
banking sector. For an insightful review, see Kathryn Judge, The Importance of Money, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 1148 (2017). For an illuminating account of how the legal organization of monetary and currency
regimes are central to financial crises in small, open economies, see Horacio Spector, Don't Cry for Me
Argentina: Economic Crises and the Restructuring of Financial Property, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 771 (2009).
29. Former Federal Reserve Governor Jeremy Stein has also outlined an approach to
monetary policy that would address financial stability. According to Stein, monetary policy should be less
accommodative when financial sector leverage is high. See Jeremy C. Stein, Incorporating Financial
Stability Considerations into a Monetary Policy Framework, Address at the International Forum on
Financial Stability (Mar. 21, 2014); Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 16883, 2011). In the model that I outline, monetary
policy would be more accommodative, relative to Stein's view, because existing regulation would
constrain aggregate financial sector leverage.
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monitoring and regulatory arbitrage. Part II describes how statutory, regulatory,
and enforcement powers were historically deployed to create rents by
suppressing competition between banks and documents how market forces,
aided by regulatory acquiescence, undermined these rents over time. Part III
suggests that this anticompetitive LPE architecture also played an important role
in limiting bank risk taking and preventing regulatory arbitrage. Part IV outlines
a model through which these insights can inform contemporary bank regulation.
I. Regulation: The Orthodox View
Before turning to the past, it is useful to first reacquaint ourselves with the
present. At the risk of simplifying, contemporary U.S. bank regulation is
organized around three institutional pillars: (1) central bank lending, (2) deposit
insurance, (3) and prudential regulation. Each is an imposing legal and
administrative edifice that has evolved considerably over time. The Federal
Reserve System was created by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913,30 while the
FDIC was created and then made a permanent agency, respectively, by the
Banking Acts of 193331 and 1935.32 Recounting the history of theory and practice
for any one of these pillars, let alone all three, would require a treatise.
Thankfully, such a treatise is not necessary. It is an achievement of contemporary
banking regulation that a coherent conceptual framework ties these pillars
together in a relatively simple way. In an even rarer correspondence between
history and logic, the sequence of adoption of these policies and their subsequent
development is also consistent, more or less, with this conceptual framework.
This Part describes how basic insights from information economics tie together
or, in the jargon of economics, render rational most of contemporary bank
regulation. These insights apply with equal force to the Basel Accords,33 which
have organized bank regulation across the G20 nations for the past three decades,
as well as the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,34 which takes familiar principles in bank
regulation and extends them to a broader set of institutions and markets.
Whatever conceptual coherence may exist in contemporary banking
regulation, there is still little reason to think we have arrived at the end of history.
The regulatory response to the greatest financial crisis and recession in the
30. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 226).
31. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227).
32. Ch. 614, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 228).
33. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (1988), http://www.bis.org/publ
/bcbsclll.pdf [http://perma.cc/WDS7-9FYG] [hereinafter Basel I]; Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl28.pdf [http:/
perma.cc/C6HR-CPMZ] [hereinafter Basel II]; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III:
Finalising Post-Crisis Reforms, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (2017), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ
/d424.pdf [http://perma.cc/8QNK-X9EM].
34. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
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United States, at least with respect to banking, largely doubled down on an
existing set of practices.35 Rather than instilling confidence, this recapitulation
should give rise to suspicion whether among scholars, policymakers, or the
general public-about its likely success. As explained in this Part, the conceptual
weaknesses of existing regulation are well understood, and these weaknesses
played a central role in the recent crisis. While ready-to-hand solutions do not
exist, there is no cause for intellectual complacency or self-satisfaction in the
field of banking or financial regulation. At least to some degree, both
dissatisfaction with the current orthodoxy and search for viable alternatives are
necessary for a healthy debate.
This brings us to the orthodoxy. According to standard economic theory, if
banking activity requires regulation this phenomenon must be the result of a
particular market failure.36 Banking panics are the most fundamental market
failure that banking regulation seeks to address.37 Bank regulation therefore
requires a conceptual framework that can both explain banking panics and assess
the costs and benefits of attempts to mitigate their effects. The potential for
banking panics arises from the very nature of banking activity. Banking
institutions, defined broadly, engage in substantial levels of credit, liquidity, and
maturity transformation.38 They finance risky, illiquid, and long-term assets by
issuing safe, liquid, and short-term liabilities. This makes the banking system
subject to instability from coordination failures that is, excessive withdrawals
of funding to the system by depositors or other investors.39 Such withdrawals can
be triggered by the revelation of unexpected risks or losses in the banking
system.40 By disrupting both the supply and demand for credit, banking panics
can result in inefficiently large and prolonged contractions of economic
activity.4 '
35. For example, it is fair to call the changes that took place from Basel II to Basel III
as ones largely of degree rather than kind. See Anat Admati, The Missed Opportunity and Challenge of
Capital Regulation, 235 NAT'L INST. ECON. REV. 4 (2016) (criticizing the Basel approach).
36. See MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF
BANKS (1994) (explaining bank regulation as a response to different market failures).
37. Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 6.
38. All theoretical descriptions of banking are historically contingent. The features
described here are characteristic of banking in the twentieth century. Maturity transformation was not as
important a feature of banking in the nineteenth century. MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 184 (2016). Nineteenth century banks held predominantly short-term
assets. Yet the problems of credit and liquidity transformation were sufficient enough to feature regular
banking panics.
39. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (providing a canonical account of bank runs.)
40. V.V. Chari & Ravi Jagannathan, Banking Panics, Information, and Rational
Expectations Equilibrium, 43 J. FIN. 749 (1988) (providing a canonical account of bank runs based on
depositor inferences about bank health but without imposing the constraint that banks honor withdrawals
on first-come, first-served basis).
41. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation
ofthe Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983).
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Banking activity therefore creates a textbook example of an externality.
Individual banks and investors in banks do not internalize the risks to the
financial system in the form of banking panics-from the issuance of bank
debt.42 Left to their own devices, markets are likely to produce too much bank
debt and to be too unstable from a social point of view. Consistent with this
observation, banking panics were commonplace throughout the nineteenth
century when there was little regulatory oversight of banking and liberal
conditions of entry.43
Creating a central bank with the ability to serve as a lender of last resort
can help mitigate such panics. In a panic, most banks are unable to pay depositors
not because they are insolvent but because they are illiquid. They lack the ability
to raise funds by selling assets or borrowing against them without incurring large
losses in the process. A central bank should, according to Walter Baghot's
dictum, lend freely to banks against good collateral in order to quell a panic.44
Consistent with this dictum, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created a central
banking system with the aim of preventing the recurrence of banking panics.45
Member banks were granted the ability to borrow through the Federal Reserve
system. Funds obtained in this way were held in the form of reserves with a
regional Federal Reserve Bank. The intended effect of central bank reserves and
access to lending was to provide additional confidence to bank depositors.
However, the limited ability of the Federal Reserve to stabilize the banking
system in the 1930s suggested that other policy tools were required to
supplement his role of the central bank.
A more direct way of preventing bank panics is to insure depositors against
losses. The introduction of federal deposit insurance in the Banking Act of 1933
is one of the most important reasons for the absence of banking panics in
subsequent decades.46 If depositors know that their claims are guaranteed by the
federal government, then they have little incentive to withdraw funds from banks
in the event of bad news. A banking system whose liabilities consist mostly of
insured deposits is virtually panic proof as long as the federal government
remains solvent.
42. This idea can be captured in a number of ways. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert
Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47 J. FIN. 1343 (1992)
(focusing on liquidity constraints and fire sales), Enrico Perotti & Javier Suarez, A Pigouvian Approach
to Liquidity Regulation, 7 INT'L J. CENT. BANKING 3 (2011) (focusing on debt maturity and sudden
withdrawals).
43. See Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 6.
44. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET
(1873).
45. David C. Wheelock, The Fed's Formative Years (1913-1939), FED. RES. HIST.,
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/fedsformative y ars [http://perma.cc/N75R-RK86]. For a
comprehensive account of the Federal Reserve's history, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016); and ALLEN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE, VOLUMES 1 AND 2 (2003).
46. BARR ET AL., supra note 38 at 47-52.
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Deposit insurance, however, also eliminates the incentives of depositors to
monitor bank risk. As a result, deposit insurance exacerbates another market
failure in banking risk shifting. Risk shifting arises from limited liability and
the agency conflict between shareholders and depositors in a bank.47 Suppose a
bank raises deposits to finance its loans. Once the terms of the deposit contract
have been fixed, the bank has an incentive to increase the risk of its loans. Any
additional gains go to shareholders, while additional losses (over and above what
would wipe out the shareholders) are borne by the depositors. Such risk shifting
or asset substitution is a concern in any entity with both equity and debt, but
deposit insurance magnifies this problem by relieving depositors of the burden
of monitoring banks.
Deposit insurance instead places this responsibility in the hands of bank
regulators.4 8 In theory, bank regulators could force banks to internalize the risks
they impose on depositors through deposit-insurance premiums. Historically,
however, the FDIC has charged a basically flat premium.4 9 Unsurprisingly, flat
insurance premiums do little to solve the problem of risk shifting. More formally,
in a deposit insurance scheme where banks pay a fixed price for insurance, bank
shareholders own a put option on the value of bank assets with a strike price that
is equal to the maturity value of the outstanding debt.5 o A bank operating under
such a scheme has trong incentives to raise the value of this option by increasing
its asset risk and/or reducing its ratio of equity relative to debt.
Recognizing the incentives faced by banks, bank regulators have developed
a number of additional tools, which fall under the rubric of prudential regulation,
to monitor and control bank risk taking. These measures operate as a substitute
for risk-based deposit insurance premiums. Prudential regulation operates
through restrictions on bank lending, such as limits on portfolio concentration
and related transactions, and restrictions on the liability side of the balance sheet,
such as capital and liquidity requirements. Prudential regulations are enforced
through both reporting requirements and regular bank examinations.
Capital requirements are perhaps the most important tool to address such
prudential concerns.' Capital requirements have been used informally as part of
the examination system since its beginnings. Binding capital requirements were
introduced in the United States in the 1980s.52 Since that time U.S. capital
requirements have, with some exceptions, moved in concert with the
47. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
48. Fischer Black et al., An Approach to the Regulation ofBank Holding Companies,
51 J. BUS. 379 (1978).
49. Risk-based premiums were only introduced through the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105. Stat. 2236 (1991).
50. Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and
Loan Guarantees, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 3 (1977).
51. BARR ET AL., supra note 38, at 259.
52. Id. at 285-307.
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international standards promulgated by the Basel Committee on Bank
Supervision.5
The idea behind increasing bank capital or equity through such
requirements are straightforward.54 First, an increase in capital lowers the
likelihood of panics by non-insured depositors and other bank debt holders
because there is a larger equity cushion to avoid losses. Second, holding
ownership shares constant, an increase in capital weakens bank shareholders'
incentives to increase bank risk. Shareholders have more to lose before debt
holders experience a loss. Finally, by regulating the liability side of the balance
sheet, capital requirements allow regulators to avoid, at least to some extent,
exercising judgment over what investments banks make.
The regulatory response to the recent financial crisis can be understood, at
least on the banking side, as an expansion of the pre-existing framework of
central bank support, debt guarantees, and prudential regulation. While the
details of this expansion were complex, they are broadly consistent with two
principles. First, the U.S. government will support he entire short-term debt
market in the event of a market-wide panic.56 This includes Federal Reserve
loans to bank and non-bank institutions that issue panic-prone debt as well as
purchases of such debt. It also includes expanding the effective quantity and
scope of short-term debt guarantees a necessary to quell a market panic. In the
midst of the crisis in 2008, the FDIC raised the amount of insured deposits per
account to $250,0005' and, more importantly, the Treasury Department
temporarily guaranteed all claims on participating money market funds.
Second, capital and liquidity requirements remain the primary regulatory tool to
counteract the externality created by short-term bank debt. The Dodd-Frank Act
of 2010 and its implementing regulations raise capital requirements for large
bank holding companies and introduce stress tests to ensure that bank capital
remains adequate under stressed conditions.59 They also create a set of new
liquidity requirements and accompanying stress tests that serve a similar
53. Id.
54. Consistent with the banking literature, I will use the term bank capital to refer to
bank equity.
55. Prasad Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation, 43
J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (2014).
56. See ERIC POSNER, LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF
BAILOUTS (2017) (arguing that future bailouts will inevitably occur and are generally beneficial). Horacio
Spector made a similar argument about beneficial government intervention n the context of the
Argentinian financial crisis of the early 2000s. Spector, supra note 28.
57. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008 Temporarily Increases Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 Per Depositor
(Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08093.html [http://perma.cc/S8KY-DJ4N].
58. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds, (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hpll61.aspx [http://perma.cc/MTH9-DY8K]
59. BARR ET AL., supra note 36, at 307-33.
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purpose. While there are some novel regulatory elements to these schemes,60
they are broadly consistent with the Basel principles described above.
Was doubling down on the existing regulatory framework the only feasible
response to the financial crisis? One cannot fault policymakers for sticking with
a known paradigm, especially when the costs and benefits of other alternatives
were poorly known. But it would be an equal mistake not to look outside the
bounds of bank regulation orthodoxy at alternative modes of regulation. There
are a number of reasons to be skeptical of the ability of the existing framework
to ensure a stable banking system.
Capital and liquidity requirements may prove insufficient as tools to control
bank risk taking. As described above, these requirements are a response to the
fragility of banks' financial structure, the externalities created by banking panics,
and the added incentives for isk taking created by implicit and explicit
government guarantees. They are constrained in fundamental ways by the
inability of regulators to observe and price bank risk taking with great accuracy.
Just as this inability limits the usefulness of deposit insurance premiums in the
presence of risk shifting, it also places important limits on capital requirements.6'
To be effective, capital requirements should be higher for banks that hold
riskier assets. Imposing a capital requirement also changes a bank's risk-shifting
calculus. An increase in required capital can lead a bank to increase its asset
risk.62 Capital requirements must herefore also be able to counteract banks'
strategic response to their adoption. Consistent with this logic, the history of
capital requirements has been one of ever-increasing complexity in the tools
employed to measure bank risks. It has also been marked by the extensive
devolution of this task to banks themselves.6 3
Of course, the need to monitor bank risk taking diminishes if capital
requirements can be set at an arbitrarily high level. A regulated banking system
funded with hardly any short-term debt has little chance of experiencing a large-
scale panic. On the other hand, it would not be much of a banking system.
Investors demand for the safe, highly liquid debt that banks issue implies that
banking, as a functional if not a legal matter, will simply take place outside of
the regulated banking system.64
Capital requirements do not answer the question of whether or how to
regulate banking activity that takes place outside of banks or bank holding
companies. In the medium to long run, capital requirements set at levels high
enough to constrain bank risk only determine the size of the regulated banking
60. Dodd-Frank Act introduces a novel system of stress tests that come under the
category of macroprudential regulation. Id.
61. Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation When 'Banks' and 'Banking' are not the Same,
Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy, 10 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 108 (1994).
62. XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CH-ARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 291-
96 (1997).
63. See Krishnamurthy, supra note 55 (recounting the history of this devolution).
64. Gorton, supra note 61.
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system relative to the unregulated one.65 The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to
address this issue by giving the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)
authority to designate nonbank financial institutions as systemically important
and subject hem to regulation by the Federal Reserve.6 6 Thus far, this process
has not produced a coherent set of principles for either designating such
institutions or regulating designated institutions.67 Setting aside the legal issues
that have beset he FSOC's authority, the FSOC's designation decisions have not
focused on those activities and institutions that are the most direct substitutes for
banking activity.
These weaknesses of existing regulation viewed against the background
of implicit and explicit guarantees-suggest a specific agenda for the search for
an alternative regulatory model. First, it should reduce bank incentives to
increase risk in ways that do not require regulators to directly observe it. Second,
it should accommodate the migration of banking activity outside the regulated
banking system. In this Article, I suggest hat the competitive restrictions in New
Deal bank regulation, despite their noted flaws, provide a historical example of
just such a model.
II. Restrictions on Competition
It would be nafve to think that contemporary issues in financial regulation
could be resolved by simply reinstituting past practices. Nevertheless, the past
offers a laboratory of examples from which the present can draw important
analogies, if not direct blueprints. New Deal banking regulation is an especially
salient example to consider because it overlaps with the "quiet period" in U.S.
financial regulation. Most of the edifice of New Deal banking regulation-
central bank lending, deposit insurance, and prudential regulation remains
intact and has even grown in scope and intensity since its inception. What no
longer remains are the numerous competitive restrictions-on price, product,
entry, and location expansion that New Deal regulation placed on banking.
Political economy aside, such restrictions have gone out of intellectual fashion
for a reason. Textbook economics clearly identifies the distortions they introduce
into economic decision making and their associated costs.
This Article nevertheless seeks to rehabilitate the regulatory role of
competitive restrictions in New Deal banking. These features of the New Deal
regulation had beneficial consequences both for controlling bank risk taking
and for regulating the boundary of banking activity that may be helpful in
65. Id.
66. BARR ET AL., supra note 38, at 698.
67. For a comprehensive account of the FSOC's structure, authority, and possible
justifications, see Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank
Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813 (2017). For a thoughtful institutional analysis of the Federal Reserve's
regulatory powers, see Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft Constraints, 78 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (2015).
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rethinking the future of banking regulation. Section II.A analyzes the legal and
regulatory mechanisms through which competitive restrictions created and
preserved the ability of banks to earn rents or super-competitive profits. Section
II.B then describes the critique of these restrictions, focusing on the public-
choice argument of George Stigler that they served largely as a means of
organizing and enforcing a banking cartel. Section II.C concludes with an
account of the demise of these restrictions and the various social and economic
forces that were responsible for it. This analysis sets the stage for Part III, which
suggests that the benefits of these restrictions are best understood by embracing
the public choice critique. Properly understood, creating rents for the banking
industry can have distinct regulatory benefits in addition to costs.
A. The Fierce Urgency of NOW
I begin with a parable of competitive restrictions in bank regulation just as
they were to enter a period of sunset. The moral of the story is that these aspects
of bank regulation appear to be textbook examples of regulatory capture and,
more particularly, of the use of state power to create and enforce a banking cartel.
I illustrate these arguments using two classic articles written on the subject by
George Stigler. Stigler's account of both regulation and oligopoly were central
to what became known as the public-choice view of regulation. I then suggest
that it is precisely through this public-choice lens that we can also understand
some of the benefits of competitive restrictions.
In 1972, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts removed a seemingly
innocuous brick from the edifice of the New-Deal banking system. The Court,
in Consumer Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, considered whether a
mutual savings bank subject to Title XII, Chapter 168 of the Massachusetts
General Laws had the authority to "arrange for the transfer of funds from savings
accounts by withdrawal orders in negotiable form without requiring the depositor
or his representative to appear at the bank's offices."68 It decided that mutual
savings banks did indeed have such authority.69
The decision provoked a regulatory maelstrom. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) immediately enacted a rule to ensure that FDIC-
insured banks could not follow suit that is-except in Massachusetts.70
Congress stepped in with alacrity to put out the fire. Section 2 of Public Law No.
93-100, passed in 1973, declared that "(n)o depository institution shall allow the
owner of a deposit or account on which interest or dividends are paid to make
withdrawals by negotiable or transferable instruments for the purpose of making
transfers to third parties, except that such withdrawals may be made in . ..
68. 282 N.E.2d 416, 416 (1972).
69. Id. at 417.
70. 12 C.F.R. § 329.0 (2017)
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Massachusetts."7 ' The term depository institution was defined broadly in the Act
to include FDIC-insured banks, state banks, savings banks, mutual savings
banks, and federal and state-chartered savings and loan associations.72 The
Massachusetts revolution in "withdrawal orders in negotiable form" had been
contained, if not fully thwarted.
How could a little-known certainly to the general public-1972 case on
the rights of Massachusetts-chartered and operated mutual savings banks to offer
"negotiable order of withdrawal" (NOW) accounts result in FDIC rulemaking
and Congressional legislation in less than a year? What was the fierce urgency
of NOW? Just a year earlier George Stigler, in his article The Theory of
Economic Regulation, had delivered a pointed explanation for this interplay
between the banking industry and its regulators: "as a rule, regulation is acquired
by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."73
It is undeniable that bank regulation acted to create cartel profits for banks.
In fact, Stigler himself provided the paradigmatic framework with which to
understand such cartel behavior. In his 1964 article, The Theory of Oligopoly,
Stigler set out to reconcile the universal desire of oligopolists
to collude to maximize joint profits ... with facts, such as that collusion is
impossible for many firms and collusion is much more effective in some
circumstances than in others. The reconciliation is found in the problem of
policing a collusive agreement, which proves to be a problem in the theory of
information.74
According to Stigler's now-textbook account,75 a successful cartel must be
able to come to an agreement with respect o the products or services offered and
enforce the terms of that agreement. Enforcement requires an ability to detect
any deviation from the agreement and to punish those who deviate by quickly
and completely removing the resulting benefits.76 The success of enforcement
depends crucially on the information environment of the cartel.77
It would be difficult to come up with a better example of regulation
operating to enforce a cartel than New Deal bank regulation. Consider first the
71. Pub. L. No. 93-100, 87 Sta. 342 (1973).
72. Id.
73. Stigler, supra note 1, at 3.
74. George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964).
75. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Theories of Oligopoly Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION VOLUME 1 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) (summarizing
theories of oligopoly behavior).
76. Stigler, supra note 74.
77. These insights were subsequently formalized using the tools of game theory in
Edward J. Green & Robert Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52
ECONOMETRICA, 87 (1984); Dilip Abreu et al., Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring, 39
J. ECON. THEORY 251 (1986).
78. Stigler explicitly noted the role that entry and price restrictions by the FDIC and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board played in preserving the competitive position and profits of the banking
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condition that a cartel must come to an agreement on price. New Deal banking
regulation explicitly fixed the rates at which banks borrowed. The Banking Act
of 1933 prohibited the payment of interest "directly or indirectly by any device
whatsoever ... on any deposit which is payable on demand" by member banks
of the Federal Reserve.79 The Act also directed the Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
to regulate the rates of interest paid by member banks on time and savings
deposits.0 Analogous prohibitions on deposit interest and limits on time and
savings deposits were established by the FDIC for FDIC-insured banks in 193581
and by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) for savings and loan banks
that were insured by the FSLIC in 1966.82 Moreover, when state legislatures
attempted to set ceilings on lending rates through usury laws, bank regulation
helped banks to minimize the losses from such ceilings.83 There can be no surer
way for a bank to make profits than through regulations that enable them to
borrow low and lend high.
As Stigler also pointed out, "collusion normally involves much more than
'the' price" because "even with a single, physically homogenous product, he
profits will be reduced if differences among buyers are ignored."84 As a result,
"a price structure of some complexity will usually be the goal of collusive
oligopolists."8 5 Stigler specifically mentioned two dimensions of buyer
difference-the size and urgency of purchase-that a cartel would find it useful
to distinguish in setting prices.8 6
Consistent with this observation, the Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966
required the three federal agencies with interest rate-setting powers FRB,
FDIC, and FHLBB-to consult with one another in determining rates.
Consultation is, after all, a prerequisite to any complicated agreement.7 The
statute clearly contemplated an agreement that would take into account
differences among buyers. The agencies were authorized to limit the rates to be
paid on time and savings deposits, and they were further authorized to:
industry. Stigler, supra note 73, at 5; see also Sam Peltzman, Entry in Commercial Banking, 8 J.L. &
ECON. 11 (1965) (providing evidence that regulation limited entry in banking markets).
79. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
80. Id. All nationally chartered banks were member of the Federal Reserve System.
State-chartered banks could elect to be member banks.
81. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, §. 101, 49 Stat. 684.
82. Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823. Savings
and loan banks were limited in their ability to offer demand deposits.
83. National banks, which are regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), were permitted to charge rates in accordance with the laws of the State where the bank
is located. The OCC interpreted federal banking law to allow national banks to charge the highest available
rate for a lender in a particular state, even if the lender to which the highest rate applied was not a bank.
12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (2017). Federal law also permitted national banks to charge rates one percent higher
than the federal discount rate, even if the resulting rate would violate state usury law. 12 U.S.C. § 85
(2018).
84. Stigler, supra note 74, at 45.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Pub. L. No. 89-597, 80 Stat. 823 (1966).
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prescribe different rate limitations for different classes of deposits, shares, or
withdrawable accounts, for deposits, shares, or withdrawable accounts of
different amounts or with different maturities or subject to different conditions
regarding withdrawal or payment, according to the nature or location of such
members or institutions or their depositors, shareholders, or withdrawable
accountholders or according to such other reasonable bases as (the agency) may
deem desirable in the public interest.
Interest rate ceilings on deposits and savings accounts, like all price
controls, created the opportunity for a competitor to offer a higher rate and steal
bank customers. This is exactly what took place in Massachusetts in 1972.
Massachusetts had its own state-run insurance scheme for mutual savings banks.
As a result, its mutual savings banks were not bound by any of the federal bank
regulators FDIC, the OCC, the FRB or the FSLIC. 89 This freedom from federal
regulation presented a competitive opportunity. The negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) allowed the owner of a savings account to be able to make
transfers to a third party. The owner could then receive the higher interest rate
permitted for savings accounts while retaining the ability to make payments to
third parties that was the hallmark of a deposit or transaction account.
What was at stake for the banking cartel in preventing such accounts? Just
about everything. FDIC-insured banks had a near monopoly over the ability to
offer demand deposits. In 1970, FDIC-insured banks held $482 billion in total
deposits, and they paid no interest on over fifty percent of this total ($247
billion).90 If Massachusetts mutual banks could offer interest-paying NOW
accounts, they would attract demand deposits from banks. They would also
attract savings deposits from savings-and-loan banks that were unable to offer
demand deposits. Banks in Massachusetts would have to respond by obtaining
regulatory permission to offer their own NOW accounts combining transaction
services with interest on savings. If NOW accounts spread nationwide, this
would threaten $247 billion or about one quarter of 1970 U.S. GDP91-in
interest-free deposits for FDIC-insured banks. The Massachusetts example also
illustrates the extent to which regulatory competition could undermine a
regulation-created cartel. The Massachusetts savings banks constituted a
competitive threat only because of the subsidy they received from the state-run
insurance program. Without deposit insurance, they would not be able to attract
deposits from FDIC-insured banks.
88. Id.
89. The OCC only regulated banks with national charters, the FRB only regulated state
banks if they chose to become members of the Federal Reserve, and federal interest rate caps applied to
state-chartered commercial banks and savings and loan banks only if they were insured by the FDIC or
the FSLIC. Massachusetts mutual banks did not fall under any of these categories.
90. Historical Statistics on Banking, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www5.fdic.gov
/hsob/HSOBRpt.asp [http://perma.cc/D86U-RWQC].
91. Gross Domestic Product, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis (Fed. 28, 2018), http:/
fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP [http://perma.cc/6XSS-3BUL].
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The New Deal regulatory framework was, however, effectively designed to
facilitate detection and punishment of deviations from the cartel agreement. The
institutional channels of detection and punishment could be readily seen in the
Massachusetts case. The Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks, the FDIC, and
Congress all stepped in, with alacrity, to prevent nation-wide competition in
NOW accounts, while simultaneously allowing banks to offer them within
Massachusetts. The competitive threat to banks arose from outside the umbrella
of federal banking regulation. The price deviation was nevertheless detected by
the Massachusetts Commissioner of Banks when the Consumer Savings Bank
sought regulatory approval for its plan to offer negotiable withdrawals from
savings accounts. The approval process for all new accounts was designed to
reveal this information to the regulator. And while it is possible that he good
Commissioner would have immediately recognized the national threat to the
banking industry posed by Consumer Savings Bank's application, it is unlikely
that the Commissioner did not receive advice on this issue from the state's
banking interests. Massachusetts' banks that were competitors of the savings
bank were well positioned to monitor the account offerings of their rivals as well
as their regulatory applications and to inform the Commissioner of any disguised
attempts to undermine the system. The Commissioner denied the request, stating
that negotiable withdrawal would create a new account with features that were
prohibited under Massachusetts law. But this first attempt at punishment failed
when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts overturned the
Commissioner's denial.
The court's decision provoked a public response from the industry and from
regulators. Shortly after the decision, the American Banker warned that the
"entry of savings banks into the checking account business is potentially
disastrous for commercial banks in the commonwealth."92 The Massachusetts
Commissioner agreed that
There is a delicate balance of power between commercial banks and thrift
institutions. Different statutory and regulatory provisions over the years, at both
the state and Federal level, have been designed to maintain this equilibrium, in
the interest of the banks, and, ultimately, of the public. Every expansion of the
powers of one segment of the banking industry must have an adverse effect on
other types of institutions unless some accommodation is made to extend their
powers as well.
9 3
The President of the Boston Federal Reserve also saw the case's "potential
for disrupting the financial stability of the banking structure."94 The FRB
92. Alan J. Kaplan, Comment, The Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) Account:
'Checking Accounts'for Savings Banks? 14 B.C. L. REV. 471, 488 (1973) (quoting Freyda P. Koplow,
Massachusetts Legal Decision Confuses Savings Bank Status, AM. BANKER, SEPT. 25, 1972, at 17).
93. Kaplan, supra note 92, at 488 (quoting Koplow, supra note 92, at 17).
94. Id. (quoting Boston Globe, Oct. 6, 1972, at 37 (statement of Frank Morris, President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston)).
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immediately proposed regulation that would use its clearing authority to prevent
this possibility. Any nonmember bank that sought o utilize the Federal Reserve
system to clear NOW items would be required to maintain a clearing account
with the FRB equal to three percent of its NOW deposits.95 Three percent just
happened to be the reserve requirement for FRB member savings accounts. In
effect, the FRB proposed to institute reserve requirements on Massachusetts
mutual savings banks offering NOW accounts through its control of the payment
system.96 Despite its ingenuity, the proposal was not pursued.
The FDIC did, however, issue rules that permitted banks in Massachusetts
to establish NOW accounts while making it clear that banks in other states were
still prohibited from doing so.97 Congress subsequently extended this rule to all
banks.98 As a result of this swift regulatory and legislative response, mutual
banks in Massachusetts were prevented from gaining any lasting competitive
advantage. This sent a clear message of deterrence to potential competitors in
other states. In Massachusetts, mutual banks now had to compete with banks that
could offer NOW accounts combining transactional services with higher interest
rates. Banks' ability to earn revenues remained unchanged, but borrowing costs
were now higher across all institutions. The price deviation had been detected
and successfully punished, at a collective cost o the industry.
B. Public Choice
This example is just one instance of how New Deal regulation acted to
protect profits within the banking industry. In addition to pillars of central bank
support, deposit insurance, and prudential oversight, New Deal bank regulation
maintained an elaborate system of price, product, entry, and location restrictions
that shielded banks from competition. As we have seen, the Banking Act of 1933
controlled prices.
The scope of banking products or services was regulated by the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933. Section 16 of the Act prohibited national banks from
underwriting, selling, or dealing in securities, while Section 20 prohibited such
banks from affiliating with any firms principally engaged in these activities.99
Section 21 of the Act, in turn, prohibited firms that issued, underwrote, sold, or
distributed securities from receiving deposits. These restrictions constituted a
quid pro quo between the banking and securities industries. Banks maintained
control over deposits, while securities firms operating as broker-dealers were
95. See 38 Fed. Reg. 26,469 (1973).
96. Alan Kaplan, Federal Legislative and Regulatory Treatment ofNOWAccounts, 91
BANKING L.J. 442 (1974).
97. 12 C.F.R. § 329.0 (1972)
98. Pub. L. No. 93-100, 87 Stat. 342 (2017).
99. Other sections of the Act extended these prohibitions to state banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System and state nonmember banks that were insured by the FDIC.
Section 20 was repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. See BARR ET AL., supra note 38, at 47-
58.
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protected from competition by banks. The restrictions on bank activities even
had a benefit to banks. Services like brokerage and investment advice are
complements to offering deposits. Bank competition in complementary services
would undermine the effect of price and entry restrictions in the deposit
market.' Restrictions that prevented banks from engaging in securities-related
activity actually helped them to avoid competing away the benefits of their
control over deposits.
In the case of entry, the FDIC's control over federal deposit insurance gave
it effective power over new charters in banking.'0' The Banking Act of 1935 set
up a system of charter approval in which almost all new bank charters had to be
approved by a federal banking regulator.102 Before granting a new charter,
regulators were required to assess the financial history and condition of a bank,
its capital adequacy, its future earnings prospects, and "the convenience and
needs of the community to be served by the bank."103 Charter applications were
frequently denied on these grounds,104 and most empirical evidence suggests that
the federal charter approval system lowered bank entry relative to what would
have prevailed in its absence.0 5
State and federal law imposed limits on bank location through restrictions
on bank branching both within and across state lines. The Douglas Amendment
to the Bank Company Holding Act of 1956 prohibited out-of-state bank holding
companies from acquiring a bank without the permission of the target bank's
state regulator. At the time, no state provided such approval. Most states had
laws that also limited within-state branching. Some states prohibited branching
entirely, while others restricted branching to contiguous counties or to a
prescribed geographic distance from the bank's headquarters.106 The competitive
equality doctrine in federal banking law meant that these branching restrictions
also applied to nationally chartered banks operating in those states. The empirical
100. For example, even if the government fixes the price of left shoes, if shoemakers
can freely set the price of right shoes, the market for shoe pairs will still be competitive.
101. State-chartered banks could not effectively compete unless they were insured by
the FDIC.
102. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had responsibility for national bank
charters, the Federal Reserve Board had responsibility for state banks that were member of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had responsibility for state banks that
were insured by the FDIC. Chartering authority lay solely in the hands of state regulators for state banks
that did not receive FDIC insurance and were not Federal Reserve member banks. See BARR ET AL., supra
note 38, at 157-83.
103. Banking Act of 1935, Ch. 614, Sec. 101, 49 Stab. 684.
104. Peltzman, supra note 78; David A. AlhadeffA Reconsideration ofRestrictions on
Bank Entry, 76 QJ. ECON. 246 (1962).
105. See Peltzman, supra note 78.
106. Dean F. Amel, State Laws Affecting the Geographic Expansion of Commercial





The Consequences of Restrictions on Competition
evidence is strong that these restrictions limited the scale of bank entry and
expansion.'0 7
For most of the last fifty years, scholars have inveighed against these
features of New Deal bank regulation. Price controls introduce a number of
distortions into the deposit market. Depositors are less likely to save because of
the lower returns to saving. Banks can compete around these restrictions by
offering discounts on complementary products, which leads consumers to
purchase bundles of financial services that they value less they would in the
absence of such controls. For this reason, price and product regulation usually
come together. Below-market deposit rates result in a regressive transfer of
wealth from bank depositors to bank equity holders. This view was shared by
economists across the political spectrum, including luminaries such as Milton
Friedman' and James Tobin.109 According to Friedman, the system of deposit
rate controls "subjected the commercial banking system and the financial
system more broadly to severe structural adjustments for no social gain
whatsoever."
The separation of commercial and investment banking in the Glass-Steagall
Act also came under attack. Commercial banking and broker-dealer services are
complementary for many bank customers. Artificially separating these activities
foregoes operational efficiencies and raises the cost of providing services. It also
results in double markups to customers if both commercial and investment banks
possess some degree of market power. Preventing commercial banks from
pursuing alternative income streams leads, it was argued, led to an inefficiently
diversified and therefore fragile banking sector. For Jonathan Macey, one of the
leading legal scholars of banking regulation, "any notion that Glass-Steagall can
be justified on grounds that commercial banks are somehow made safer by the
Act's prohibitions is clearly misguided, since the law, if anything, accomplishes
precisely the opposite result."" 0
A similar critique was levied against entry and location restrictions. These
restrictions lead to higher prices for deposit and lending services. Perhaps more
importantly, they create a fragmented and undiversified banking system.
According to the noted economist and financial historian Charles Calomiris, the
107. See Jith Jayaratne & Philip Strahan, Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and
Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence From Commercial Banking, 41 J.L. & ECON. (1998) (providing evidence
that more efficient banks expanded after deregulation).
108. See Milton Friedman, Controls on Interest Rates Paid by Banks, 2 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1970) (arguing that controls on interest rates are not an effective tool of monetary
policy).
109. James Tobin, Deposit Interest Ceilings as a Monetary Control, 2 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 4 (1970) (arguing that deposit ceilings have a modest effect on monetary conditions
but pernicious effects through the suppression of interest rates to small savers and the risks created in
savings and loan associations).
110. Macey, supra note 25, at 13.
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New Deal reforms "not only failed to address the key structural problems that
had caused the crisis, they actually reinforced those structural weaknesses.""'
If the effects of price, product, entry, and location restrictions are so
pernicious, then what led to their adoption in the first place? According to
Calomiris, "the central lesson of the 1930s reforms was that comprehensive,
hasty, post-crisis reform initiatives maximize the potential for logrolling, which
facilitates the enactment of ill-conceived ideas and special interest measures that
otherwise would not have passed." 112 Some aspects of this misdiagnosis were
quite specific. Calomiris recounts how limits on interest rates and the separation
of commercial and investment banking were partly an intellectual offspring of a
misguided theory of central banking-the real bills doctrine-and the creation
of federal deposit insurance arose from a desire to preserve unit or single-branch
banking.113
Other aspects of the misdiagnosis were quite general. In their influential
account, law and economics scholars Daniel Fischel, Andrew Rosenfield, and
Robert Still write that
[W]hat is most striking about the New Deal program of banking regulation is its
similarity to the programs of public utility and common carrier regulation, many
of which (such as airline, motor carrier, and telecommunications regulation) were
established during the same period. The essential features of the New Deal
banking regulation were entry control, price control, market allocation through
the forced separation of commercial banking from investment banking and
securities activities, and close supervision of investments and related activities.
These were the essential features of airline, surface transportation, and
communications regulation as well. The similarity of these regulatory policies
was not coincidental
1 14
For these authors, the similarity of banking to utility regulation arose from
a common, misguided account of the harms of competitive markets. They echo
what I have called the "orthodox" view in noting that "banks are different from
other types of firms in that they are more susceptible to me-first behavior by
creditors. Federal deposit insurance is best understood as a regulatory response
to this prisoner's dilemma faced by bank depositors.""5  In contrast,
anticompetitive regulations in banking "have nothing to do with the reasons why
banks are different from other types of firms and thus serve no useful social
purpose.""16
111. Calomiris, supra note 25, at 541.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Daniel R. Fischel et al., The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies,
73 VA. L. REV. 301, 302-03 (1987).
115. Id. at 306
116. Id. at 338.
844
Vol. 35, 2018
The Consequences of Restrictions on Competition
The most damning critique, however, was made by George Stigler and
other scholars who advanced a public choice view of these aspects of New Deal
banking regulation. According to public choice theory, industry rent seeking
provided a better explanation for the institutional form of regulation than the
folly, much less wisdom, of public officials. Stigler's account of regulation
emphasized four key policies that industries would seek from the state: (1) direct
subsidies, (2) control over entry, (3) suppression of substitutes and promotion of
complements, and (4) control over prices."' As described above, it is difficult to
dispute how well Stigler's account fits these patterns in New Deal bank
regulation. Regulatory restrictions on price, product, entry, and location appear
perfectly designed to deliver super-competitive profits or rents to the banking
industry. The preceding parable of the NOW account is just one example of the
numerous attempts over this period by institutions to try to capture some of the
cartel profits created through bank regulation. In each instance, banking
regulators, acting through regulation designed to reveal these cartel threats,
brought to bear their enforcement power-often creatively to punish and deter
them. This regulatory game evidenced itself in arcane and seemingly nonsensical
and circular definitional disputes over terms such as "bank," "branch," "deposit
account," "savings account," and "the business of banking.""'
C. Rent Dissipation
Consistent with the Stiglerian view, competition itself played a
fundamental role in the eventual demise of these restrictions. The history of
gradual deregulation in U.S. banking has been recounted in a number of careful
studies."9 Here, I briefly describe the main forces that undermined their ole in
creating rents for banks. These developments were widely celebrated by critics
of the New Deal restriction, and they unquestionably resulted in economic
benefits. With hindsight, we can perhaps better appreciate some of their
associated costs.
Limitations on bank entry grew less important as non-bank lenders became
increasingly able to compete with banks. Industrial loan companies and other
non-bank finance companies expanded their presence in the loan market. The
growth of the corporate bond market and the commercial paper market meant
that businesses could increasingly turn to the capital markets to borrow rather
than relying on loans. Geographic restrictions also conveyed less market power
117. See Stigler, supra note 1. FDIC deposit insurance and deposit rate limits acted,
respectively, as a subsidy and price control.
118. The legal disputes around these categories are described in Macey & Miller, supra
note 14.
119. See generally Allen Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking
Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 55 (1995);
Allen Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and
Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN., 135-194 (1999) (describing the causes and effects of
bank deregulation over the course of the 1980s and 90s).
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over time. Developments in information technology made distance lending
easier and cheaper. The expansion of the capital markets lessened the importance
of geography to credit access. Non-bank lenders were able to expand
geographically by sidestepping the legal definition of a bank branch. Moreover,
as the value of geographic restrictions eroded, the restrictions themselves were
lifted.120 Starting in the 1970s, states began to loosen their restrictions on bank
branching both within and across state lines.121
Interest rate controls on deposits were undermined by a combination of
high inflation and competition from deposit substitutes. Inflation and nominal
interest rates were relatively low in the post-war period, but rose dramatically at
the end of the 1960s. During the 1970s, inflation averaged over seven percent,
with peaks that exceeded ten percent in 1974.122 This large and negative real rate
of return on deposits created the opportunity for interest-bearing deposit
substitutes to emerge. The two most prominent deposit substitutes that emerged
were Eurodollars and money market funds.123  Eurodollars are dollar-
denominated deposit liabilities issued by foreign banks, mostly in Europe.
Money market funds are short-term investment vehicles organized under th
Investment Company Act.124 They both offered the advantage to investors-in
particular, institutions and wealthy individuals-of market interest rates on
accounts that were similar to demand deposits issued by U.S. commercial
banks.125 Importantly, the development of both these substitutes was enabled by
regulatory permission. Their development had implications for both the stability
of the banking system and the conduct of monetary policy. Any combination of
regulatory coordination, congressional action, or judicial interpretation could
plausibly have curtailed these developments, but they did not.
120. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics
and Politics ofBank Branching Restrictions, 114 QJ. ECON. 1437 (1999).
121. See Amel, supra note 106.
122. Janet Yellen, Chair, Fed. Reserve, Inflation Dynamics and Monetary Policy, Philip
Gamble Memorial Lecture (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech
/yellen20150924a.htm [http://perma.cc/7QDN-8TMX].
123. BARR ET AL., supra note 38, at 1197-1221; Marvin Goodfriend, Eurodollars, in
FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON. REV. 13 (1991).
124. Money market funds are investment funds that offer investors shares that are
intended to maintain stable value of one dollar per share. Money market funds replicate many of the
features of demand deposits uch as easy withdrawal and the ability to write checks against the account.
Unlike banks, they are required to hold short term, liquid securities with very low credit risk. Like
Eurodollar deposits, money market funds offered yields that were well in excess of what could be obtained
in a demand deposit or savings account. They invested in short-term assets such as commercial paper or
Treasury Bills and offered transactional features that were similar to deposits. As a result, their yields also
closely tracked the federal funds rate. The accounting rules for these funds allowed them be valued using
an amortized cost value. Money market funds could maintain a stable net asset value-instead of a value
that floated with market prices-and be considered a cash equivalent. Money market funds also offered
checking and withdrawal features that were comparable to deposit accounts. See Barr et al., supra note
38, at 1197-1221.
125. Eurodollar yields closely matched the federal funds rate, which frequently stood
at over ten percent in the period from 1969 to 1974. See Eurodollar Deposits Rates and Effective Federal
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The collective pressure of these deposit-substitutes led to
disintermediation, that is, the loss of funds from U.S. commercial and savings
banks. As inflation accelerated again in the late 1970s and early 1980s, deposit
controls were no longer feasible. The Deposit Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 phased out interest rate ceilings for banks.126
Banks also attempted to stem the outflow of deposit and savings by creating
products that replicated the features of these deposit substitutes. The Garn St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 authorized commercial and savings
banks to offer money market deposit accounts, which mimicked most of the
features of money market fund accounts.127
The separation of commercial and investment banking suffered a similar
fate. Competition again played a central role. In the 1970s, investment banks
helped to expand the commercial paper market, which began to displace bank
lines of credit as the major source of short-term funding for large organizations.
Money market funds, in fact, were the one of the major purchasers of commercial
paper. Banks, in turn, sought to recapture some of this lost business by acquiring
the ability to underwrite commercial paper that is, to serve as a dealer in this
market. Providing broker-dealer services was a traditional province of
investment banks. Squeezed between rising short-term interest rates and long-
term assets such as mortgages with low interest rates, banks were eager to seek
new sources of fee-based revenue by serving as a broker, dealer, and investment
adviser.128
The rise of securitization and wholesale funding also brought investment
banks closer to the traditional lending business of banks, particularly in mortgage
markets. Investment banks played a crucial role in the originate-to-distribute
model of mortgage lending, acting as providers of short-term finance for
originators and as underwriters of asset-backed securities. Investment banks also
maintained large portfolios of asset-backed securities on their own balance sheet
both for investment purposes and to lend to their clients. In this respect, they
looked more like banks. To summarize, competition from non-bank lenders
pushed commercial banks into the broker-dealer business, while competition i
the broker-dealer business pushed investment banks into lending.
As in the case of deposits, regulators and courts facilitated this expansion
and blurring of commercial and investment bank functions. Federal bank
regulators and the SEC each took a permissive view with respect to expanding
the authority of their constituent institutions. Courts, faced with a series of
difficult one-off determinations, a body of precedent and practice that could be
flexibly interpreted, and no guiding philosophy to balance competing
consideration, largely acquiesced in this process. In fact, much of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which removed the final barriers to associations
126. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980).
127. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982).
128. BARR ET AL., supra note 36, at 1197-1211.
847
Yale Journal on Regulation
between banking and investment banking within a holding-company structure,
served only to codify by statute what had been already accomplished through
decades of agency and court decisions.'29
Unsurprisingly, critics of New Deal banking regulation's restrictions on
competition did not mourn their eventual erosion. However, as these restrictions
gradually gave way the quiet period in banking also came to an end. The next
Part describes the role of competitive forces in reviving banking instability in the
United States and the scholarly reconsideration of competition in banking that it
provoked. It then uses this theoretical framework to reinterpret the role that
competitive restrictions played in New Deal bank regulation, focusing on the
issues of bank risk taking and the boundaries of banking.
III. Competition and Instability
Competition in banking is not an unfettered good. If competition can result
in social harm, it follows that limits on competition can mitigate some of these
effects. There are of course many ways that regulation can limit competition,
each with different effects. Here, I summarize the theory and evidence
suggesting that the competitive restrictions in New Deal banking regulation were
especially useful in limiting bank risk taking and preventing regulatory arbitrage.
These insights inform how contemporary regulation could better address these
two issues.
The idea that unfettered or excessive competition among banks can result
in financial instability is far from new. As the New York Clearing House
Association Committee concluded in its investigation of the Panic of 1857, "a
bank having committed the first error of paying interest on its deposits is
therefore compelled, by the necessities of its position, to take the second false
step and expand its operations beyond all prudent bounds."130 This view also
dominated discussions of bank failures in the 1930s. According to Milton
Friedman, "it was widely, if mistakenly, believed that these failures were the
result of 'bad' banking and that 'bad' banking in turn was the result of risky loans
made by banks under pressure to earn enough to pay competitive rates on
deposits."13 1
During the Great Depression, the idea that excessive competition could be
ruinous was thought o apply to many industries. The National Industrial
Recovery Act of 1933 sought to create "codes of fair competition" for each
industry to limit competition with respect to prices, working hours, and wages.132
Before the Act was eventually declared unconstitutional in Schecter Poultry v.
129. Id. at 659-74.
130. George J. Bentson, Interest Payments on Demand Deposits and Bank Investment
Behavior, 72 J. POL. ECON. 431, 431-32 (1964).
131. See Milton Friedman, Controls on Interest Rates Paid by Banks, 2 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 15,18 (1970).
132. Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
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United States,'33 hundreds of industries submitted codes of fair competition that
were approved by Roosevelt's National Recovery Administration. 134 The
argument that unrestrained competition would have widespread, negative
consequences also provided a justification for extensive regulation of entry,
expansion, and pricing in a variety of industries until at least the 1980s.'35
To a substantial extent, the center of gravity of these debates has moved in
the direction of greater competition. In industries as diverse as transportation,
telecommunications, and energy, the purview of direct regulation has subsided,
while that of antitrust and competition has expanded.'36 Disagreement over
means aside, there are few areas of economic life where the aim of increasing
competition within an industry or sector does not share substantial policy and
often popular support.'3 7
In the case of banking, however, the key policy issues are to some extent
distinct from the overwhelming concern with market power that dominates
industries where direct regulation was once common and has since subsided. In
this Part, I explain the case for how limits on bank competition can enhance
financial stability. This body of theory and evidence arose against the demise of
the role of competitive restrictions and the contemporaneous rise of instability in
the banking sector.
This line of reasoning turns the public choice critique of regulation on its
head. Those aspects of regulation that create a cartel also serve a distinct and
useful regulatory purpose. The theory of oligopoly has proven invaluable in the
design of policies to enhance competition. The case banking illustrates how, in
some cases, this theory can also be deployed to beneficially constraints
competition. It also illustrates why, to be effective, such constraints must exist
within a suitable legal, political and economic order.
A. The Reemergence ofInstability
1. Rethinking Competition
The stability that characterized banking in the post-war decades came to an
end in the 1980s and 1990s. This period was marked by a rise in bank failures
and the reappearance of large-scale government rescues, most prominently the
133. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
134. Barbara Alexander, The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel
Formation & Maintenance Costs, 76 REV. ECON. & STAT. 245 (1994).
135. See Fischel et al., supra note 114.
136. See James Ming Chen, Speculative Undertakings: Rate Regulation as a Branch of
Corporate Finance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 779 (2018); see also Daniel Schwarcz, Ending Public Utility
Style Rate Regulation in Insurance, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 941 (2018) (calling for less direct regulation of
the insurance industry to reflect economic changes).
137. For the general policy arguments in favor of deregulation in these sectors, see
DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT? (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Whinston eds.,
2000)
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savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s. In the midst of these developments, a
scholarly literature arose that tried to explain the reemergence of banking
instability.
A key challenge for this literature was to explain why regulation had been
more or less effective in the prior decades. From the 1950s to the end of the
1970s, bank failures were exceedingly rare, averaging only a few per year.138
This was true despite the presence of a number of factors that would suggest
otherwise. Banks had access to insured deposits, which eliminated the need for
monitoring by depositors. The insurance premium charged to banks was
basically flat, and therefore did little to blunt incentives for risk shifting.
Branching restrictions both within and across state lines meant that there were
thousands of banks, each of them quite undiversified and subject o considerable
local economic risk. Nevertheless, it took until the 1980s for widespread banking
failures to occur.139
A potential explanation could be located in the tradeoffs between bank risk
taking and competition and how these tradeoffs vary as a function of other
features of bank regulation-in particular, deposit insurance, asset restrictions,
and capital requirements. In particular, when banks are free to choose the risk-
return profile of their assets, the incentive for risk shifting declines as the charter
value of the bank increases. This implies charter value is a potential tool with
which to control bank risk.
In his paper, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking,
Michael Keeley provided a canonical account of this mechanism.140 If a bank
possessed any degree of market power in the loan or deposit market, then this
value would be capitalized in the equity value of the bank. Current owners of
bank equity would lose this value in the event the bank failed or was taken over
by its regulator. The greater the charter value, the more it disciplined the
incentives of equity holders to avoid any increase in risk or decrease in capital
that might result in insolvency. Of course, the option value of deposit insurance
was, at least in theory, arbitrarily high. However, if a bank's charter value was
also high then it would take a large, discrete increase in risk and/or fall in capital
for the expected gain in option value to counteract the expected loss in charter
value. As long as a bank regulator was capable of observing such a large increase,
138. Failures and Assistance Transactions of all Institutions for the United States and
Other Areas, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Sept. 29, 2017), http://fred.stlouisfed.org/series
/BNKTTLA641N [http://perma.cc/28DV-7PHU].
139. Id.
140. Michael Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 1183 (1990). Alan Marcus derived this result using Merton's option approach to value bank
equity and suggested that the deregulation of banking could result in general decline in bank charter value
and a corresponding increase in bank risk. Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation andBank Financial Policy, 8 J.
BANKING& FIN., 557 (1984).
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the charter value acted to discipline bank risk taking.14' This insight was
subsequently refined and extended in the banking literature.
Competition can exacerbate bank risk taking in a number of ways.142 For
example, if a bank is able make investments in borrower-specific knowledge,
this increases the ex post switching costs for a borrower and is a source of bank
profits. In a more competitive market, banks have weaker incentives to make
these investments and the switching costs for borrowers are correspondingly
lower. The resulting loss of charter value from the value of bank-borrower
relationship can then have the effect of increasing bank asset risk.143 As another
example, if bank competition has winner-take-all features, this enhances the
incentive to take risky actions that increase market share in the short run. Such
winner-take-all competition could arise as a result of economies of scale in
banking from technology or network effects.144
This relationship between competition and increased risk taking can hold
even when manager's incentives are not aligned with those of shareholders. Less
competitive environments can create rents for managers in the form of higher
wages or the "quiet life." If these rents are dissipated through competition or
even by increasing the alignment between shareholders' and managers' interests,
the result can be an increase in bank risk taking. Rent sharing by managers also
implies that the threat of bank closure is not required for charter value to play a
disciplining role on risk. The threat of removing the manager will suffice.
The basic intuition that there is a tradeoff between competition and risk also
survives in models that consider the effects of banking regulation. Deposit
insurance, as explained above, exacerbates the incentives for risk shifting. This
feature of deposit insurance can be mitigated, though not necessarily eliminated,
if deposit insurance premiums are set so that bank equity holders internalize the
effect of any risk shifting.145 However, appeals to risk-based deposit premiums
to solve the problem of bank risk taking assume away the fundamental regulatory
141. The tradeoff between risk taking and charter value is easiest to see in the context
of full deposit insurance, but exists even when banks are symmetric and equilibrium, deposit insurance
fees to banks correctly reflect their asset risk. The key insight is there is still asymmetric information
between debt holders and banks at the time banks choose their asset risk. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale,
Competition and Stability, 36 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 453 (2004).
142. This is not to say that competition can never reduce incentives for risk taking. For
example, if a bank is able to lower its cost of funding by building a reputation for safety, then this mitigates
risk-shifting incentives. Arnoud W.A. Boot & Stuart I. Greenbaum, Bank Regulation, Reputation and
Rents: Theory and Policy Implications, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 262
(Chris Mayer & Xavier Vives eds., 1993). The authors point out that bank regulations such as deposit
insurance and capital requirements can make it more difficult for banks to acquire such a reputation.
143. David Besanko & Anjan V. Thakor,Relationship Banking, Deposit Insurance, and
Bank Portfolio Choice, in CAPITAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, supra note 142, at 292;
see also Mitchell Petersen & Raghuram Rajan, The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending
Relationships, 110 QJ. ECON. 407 (1995) (demonstrating the continued importance of local lending even
in the 1990s).
144. Allen & Gale, supra note 141. In general, any feature of competition that makes a
bank's profit function more convex exacerbates risk shifting.
145. See Carmen Matutes & Xavier Vives, Imperfect Competition, Risk Taking, and
Regulation in Banking, 4 EUR. ECON. REV. 1 (2000).
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problem. If bank risks were perfectly observable to regulators, the entire
discussion of bank regulation would be moot.
Importantly, capital requirements do not eliminate this relationship. The
standard view of capital requirements is that they force equity holders to
internalize bank risk and thereby reduces risk-taking incentives.'46 This view
may not hold, however, if capital requirements lower the charter value of banks
by raising the overall cost of capital. The net effect of a capital requirement is
ambiguous as a result of these two countervailing effects. In an important paper,
Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz show that adding deposit rate controls to a
capital requirement produces a more efficient outcome.'4 7 This result suggests
that capital requirements may have limited ability to control bank risk when
competition deposits is intense and when, as is empirically the case, bank
shareholders are diversified. This is an important issue given the reliance of
contemporary financial regulation on capital.
2. A History of the Present
These insights provide a theoretical framework with which to understand
the rise of banking instability in the 1980s and its continuation to the present.
Here, I focus on the prior period in order to highlight its continuity with the
present. I show my thesis-that increased competition can lead destabilize
banking system through increased risk taking is supported by empirical
evidence. This is not to say that such evidence is incontrovertible. It is important
to be circumspect about the limits of causal claims regarding large-scale social
processes uch as banking crises. However, one could just as easily say there is
no incontrovertible evidence that competition always enhances tability or never
increases risk. The goal in presenting this evidence is to show that the
relationship between competition and instability is empirically plausible enough
to generate a policy discussion on the possible regulatory role of limits to
competition. As noted above, banks faced increasing competition in both the loan
and deposit markets over the course of the 1970s. Consistent with a rise in
competition, measures of bank profitability began to fall.' 48 Both the rate of
return on equity and the rate of return on assets fell steadily for commercial and
savings banks from 1979 to 1991.149 The ratio of market to book value for bank
assets, a measure of the capitalized value of market power, declined from the
146. See, e.g., Frederick T. Furlong & Michael Keeley, CapitalRegulation and Bank
Risk-Taking: A Note, 13 J. BANKING & FIN. 883 (1989).
147. Thomas F. Hellman et al., Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and
Prudential Regulation, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 147 (2000). The authors also show that deposit rate controls
can be useful even if they are not actually binding on banks.
148. Keeley, supra note 140; Franklin Edwards & Fredric Mishkin, The Decline of
Traditional Banking: Implications for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, 1 ECON. POL'Y REV. 37
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1950s to the 1980s.150 Bank capital ratios also declined, suggesting that banks
were operating closer to their default threshold.'5 '
Some of this decline in profitability was undoubtedly linked to changes in
interest rates.152 As I explained above, Paul Mahoney lays most of the blame for
banking instability on movements in interest rates rather than deregulation.
Indeed, the Volcker recession of the 1980s featured a large increase in short-term
interest rates as the Federal Reserve sought to rein in inflation.153 Recessions are
generally bad news for banks.
However, the relationship between interest rates, regulation, and banking
instability cannot be easily separated. Volatility in interest rates tends to hurt
banks because, by virtue of their short-term liabilities and long-term assets, they
are heavily exposed to interest rate risk. The effects of interest rate volatility on
banks are asymmetric. When interest rates rise, banks are particularly vulnerable
because the interest they owe on their liabilities will rise, while the interest rate
on their earnings will, in the short term, not change.
During the inflationary episodes of the 1960s and 1970s, controlled deposit
rates provided banks with some protection against rising market interest rates.
Banks may have lost market share to competitors who were willing or able to
attract investors by offering higher interest rates, but banks would have also
earned a larger spread on loans. In contrast, the Volcker recession took place just
as these controls were phased out. As a result, banks had to fund their existing
stock of lower-interest loans at market interest rates. This effect was particularly
acute for savings and loan banks that held long-term, fixed rate mortgage on their
balance sheet. Inflation was undoubtedly an important macroeconomic factor in
weakening bank balance sheets across the board. However, it is unlikely to have
been the sole factor. Bank profitability continued to decline and volatility rose
even after interest rates and inflation stabilized in the early 1980s.154
As market shares and profits eroded in the 1980s, banks increased the
riskiness of both their assets and liabilities. Commercial banks' share of total
nonfinancial borrowing peaked around 1973 at around 35%, but declined to just
over 20% by 1990.155 The pattern for savings banks was similar over this period.
150. See Keeley, supra note 140. This measure is often used as an empirical proxy for
Tobin's q, the ratio of the market value of bank assets to their replacement cost. For a history of the use
of Tobin's q in different scholarly literatures, see Robert P. Bartlett & Frank Partnoy, The Misuse of
Tobin's Q, (U.C. Berkeley Pub. L. Res. Paper, 2018), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=3118020 [http://perma.cc/4QV8-2WHL].
151. Id.
152. See Mahoney, supra note 22.
153. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Effective Federal Funds Rate,
http://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS [http://perma.cc/6KZF-JXAG]. The U.S. experience with
inflation in the 1960s and 1970s cannot be separated from broader issues concerning international balance
of payments and exchange rates. Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen, Bretton Woods and the Great
Inflation in THE GREAT INFLATION: THE REBIRTH OF MODERN CENTRAL BANKING (Michael D. Bordo &
Athanasios Orphanids eds., 2013).
154. See Edward & Mishkin, supra note 148.
155. Id.
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As banks sought to replace the income lost from lending, they increased their
earnings from fees, trading, and off-balance sheet activity, such as loan
commitments, standby letters of credit, loan sales and securitization. Banks also
increased their income from serving as dealers in the over-the-counter
derivatives market. Consistent with this pattern, the share of noninterest income
to total income for commercial banks rose from less than 20% in the early 1970s
to almost 35% by the early 1990s.156
Banks' loss of market share in the overall lending market ook place despite
the fact that loans grew as a percentage of bank assets. This relative growth in
loans on banks' balance sheets occurred at the expense of safer assets such as
securities, cash, and reserves. There was also a shift in the composition of bank
lending. Banks' share in commercial and industrial (C&I) loans fell as a result
of competition from the commercial paper market and from foreign lenders, who
targeted the largest and safest nonfinancial borrowers. Banks increased their
share of mortgage loans and, within this category, increased their share of
commercial mortgages.5 7
This increase in real estate lending eventually culminated in the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s. Savings and loan institutions moved aggressively into
commercial mortgages. The number of state-chartered savings and loan
associations grew by the thousands over the course of the eighties, despite the
general decline in their profitability. Commercial banks also aggressively
expanded their presence in this market.58
The composition of bank liabilities also changed over this period.159 From
1960 to 1990 checkable deposits went from almost 60% of bank liabilities to less
than 20%. 160 This period saw the rise of short-term liabilities that paid market
interest rates at a time of rising inflation. These included large time deposits-
such as large certificates of deposit-and security repurchase agreements. By the
1990s, such money market instruments plus small certificates of deposit made
up over half of bank liabilities. The ten largest commercial banks held almost
half their liabilities as money market instruments. These liabilities involved
greater competition not only with money market mutual funds, but between
banks themselves. The owners of money market instruments were also much
156. Id. This fee income came with a different set of risks. Off-balance sheet activities
usually involved contingent liabilities. The increase in dealer activity exposed banks to risk arising from
imperfectly hedged positions in their derivatives book and from counterparty failure. See BARR ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 1074.
157. Id.
158. FDIC, The Savings and Loan Crisis and Its Relationship to Banking, in AN
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990s, at 167 (1997).
159. For detailed accounts of the changing composition of bank activities over this time,
see John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, U.S. Commercial Banking: Trends, Cycles and Policy (NBER
WORKING PAPER No. W4404 (1993)); Allen Berger et al., The Transformation of the U.S. Banking
Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 55 (1995); and
Allen Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, Consequences, and
Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135 (1999).
160. Boyd & Gertler, supra note 159, at 5.
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more likely to be institutions whose demand was much more sensitive to small
changes in interest rates. Again, much of the expansion of savings and loans
institutions in this period was funded through such volatile, higher interest
bearing deposits.'6 '
Most notably, there was a marked increase in bank failures. Bank failures
were uncommon in the 1970s, averaging under two per year despite the
celebrated stagflation that took place over much of this period. Failures increased
to 130 per year between 1982 and 1991. In 1992, the FDIC listed over 900 banks
with assets of almost $500 billion as problem institutions.'62 The savings and
loan industry collapsed over the course of the 1980s and was bailed out by
Congress through a slow sequence of regulatory and statutory interventions.
Banks that showed the greatest volatility of equity returns in the 1980s were also
those that, in earlier periods, had the lowest charter value as measured by market
to book value.6 3 These facts suggest a mechanism through which declines in
profitability were associated with subsequent risk taking.
There were, undoubtedly, a number of changes in the economic landscape
that affected bank stability in addition to the increase in competition in lending
and deposit markets. The roles of inflation and the Volcker recession cannot be
ignored. The deregulatory ideology of the period likely reduced the focus on
examinations, particularly within the Federal Home Loan Bank Board that
supervised the thrifts. The increase in competition, moreover, was itself a
function of a number of distinct forces such as changes in technology, markets,
and foreign entry. Nevertheless, the evidence is consistent with the idea that
increases in competition played an important role in the rise of bank risk taking
and instability in this period.
These events bear a striking resemblance to those of the recent financial
crisis. To be sure, the bank failures of the 1980s did not result in widespread
panic or disruption of financial markets. Nevertheless, the competitive dynamics
that led to increased risk taking in both periods had broadly similar patterns. The
buildup in risky mortgage lending prior to the recent crisis was driven by lightly-
regulated mortgage lenders.'64 These institutions increasingly funded themselves
in wholesale capital markets as part of the securitization chain. The mortgage-
backed securities created through this process were largely held by financial
institutions such as banks and broker dealers, who funded the purchases through
short-term debt.6 5 Competition played an important role in the decline of
161. FDIC, supra note 158.
162. Boyd & Gertler, supra note 159.
163. Tina W. Galloway et al., Banks' Changing Incentives and Opportunities for Risk
Taking, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 509 (1997).
164. See The Mortgage Machine, in FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 102 (2011).
165. See Dwight Jaffee et al, Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial
Crisis, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW To REPAIR A BROKEN FINANCIAL SYSTEM (Viral V.
Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).
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underwriting standards at both traditional commercial banks and thrifts.166
Eventually, the government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also
accumulated large holdings of riskier mortgage loans. This competition in on the
asset side of the balance sheet took place in lock step with competition on the
liability side, as institutional investors in short-term debt aggressively pursued
higher yields.167 Unlike the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s which was
concentrated in commercial banks and thrifts, the recent financial crisis took
place across a broader set of financial institutions, including broker dealers and
money market funds. However, in both periods the interaction between
competition, regulation, lending risk, and funding risk played an important, and
perhaps central, role.
It is ultimately beyond the scope of this Article, or any other single paper,
to comprehensively assess the role of competition in the recent financial crisis.
The goal is to instead highlight the evidence from U.S. banking history which
suggests that limits on competition played an important role in preventing the
competitive escalation of risky practices that can give rise to large-scale crises.
That said, evidence on the role of competition and financial stability is not
limited to the United States. Single-country case studies and cross-country
statistical evidence can both be interpreted to be consistent with this claim.
Higher market concentration of banks is usually associated with a lower
likelihood of major banking crises, though this relationship varies substantially
with other features of the regulatory environment.168 For this reason, country
case studies are likely to be more revealing than large, cross-country regressions
because patterns of financial organization and regulation are deeply historically
specific and exhibit substantial path dependence. Nevertheless, it is beyond the
scope of this Article to offer a comprehensive cross-country analysis of the
relationship between competition and financial stability.
With this caveat, two types of cases from the comparative literature are
worth highlighting.169 The first is cases where countries with relatively stable
banking sectors experience an episode of heightened financial instability and
crisis. Here, the experience of the Nordic countries in the 1990s provides a useful
comparison. In Finland, Norway, and Sweden, financial liberalization led to
166. See Marco Di Maggio et al., Deregulation, Competition, and the Race to the
Bottom, MGMT. SCI. (forthcoming 2018).
167. See Marcin Kacperczyk & Phillip Schnabl, How Safe are Money Market Funds?,
128 QJ. ECON. 1073 (2013).
168. See Thorsten Beck et al., Bank Concentration, Competition, and Crises, 30 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1581 (2006) (finding a positive cross-country relationship between bank concentration
and financial stability but a negative relationship between regulatory policies associated with strong state
control and limits on banks); Thorsten Beck et al., Bank Competition & Stability: Cross-Country
Heterogeneity, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 218 (2013) (finding a positive cross-country relationship
between bank concentration and financial stability varies substantially with the regulatory environment).
169. In selecting case studies, I have excluded developing countries, many of them in
Latin America, with histories of recurring financial crises. Argentina is a developed country whose
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large increases in lending in what had previously been a highly regulated and
conservative banking sector. While broader macroeconomic policies concerning
exchange rates and capital inflows played an important role, a key mechanism
through which these policies translated into lending were the relaxation of prior
restraints on bank lending and the induced competition for market share between
financial institutions that fed a real estate bubble.17 0
The second type of cases worth mentioning are of banking systems that
have remained stable even against the background of considerably
macroeconomic instability. Canada and Australia, for example, are frequently
cited as countries that have managed to avoid major banking crises. 171 The
Canadian example is especially useful because of how closely its economy is
integrated with that of the United States. The relative stability of Canadian
banking, as compared to the United States, has endured for over one hundred and
fifty years.172 The contrast between Canada and United States was remarked
upon throughout the history of U.S. banking panics in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, most notably in the aftermath of the Panic of 1908 and the
debates that led to the creation of the Federal Reserve.
Remarkably, Canada suffered no major bank failures during the Great
Depression.173 This fact is especially salient given the common agricultural
shocks faced by both the United States and Canada, the size of agricultural
sector, and importance of trade to the Canadian economy. While the Canadian
economy contracted substantially during the Depression, the comparative
stability of its banking system likely resulted in smaller financial spillovers
relative to the United States.174 The superior regional diversification of Canadian
banks, again relative to the fragmented U.S. structure, is an important factor in
this difference. However, there is also evidence that the greater concentration of
the Canadian banking sector also enhanced stability in other ways. In particular,
banks had incentives to coordinate their activity and offer conditional support to
one another in the event of a common shock. This need for coordination also
affected bank incentives to accept common regulatory restrictions that would
limit the liability that large banks could place on each other. These incentives are
170. Lars Jonung, Twelve Lessons from the Nordic Experience of Financial
Liberalization, in THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN: THE NORDIC EXPERIENCE OF
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 301 (Lars Jonung et al. eds., 2009); Seppo Honkapohja, Financial Crises:
Lessons from the Nordic Experience, 13 J. FIN. STABILITY 193 (2014),
171. See, e.g., Gordon Isfeld, Canada's Banks Shake Off Global Sector Crisis, FIN.
POST (Oct. 10, 2012) http://business.financialpost.com/news/fp-street/canadas-banks-shake-off-global-
sector-crisis [http://perma.cc/QJN9-2BLD]; Phil Dobbie, How Australia Ducked the Crisis,
MONEYWATCH (Oct. 14, 2009, 3:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-australia-ducked-the-
crisis/ [http://perma.cc/2E2P-5XS3].
172. Michael D. Bordo et al., Why Didn't Canada Have a Banking Crisis in 2008 (or
in 1930, or 1907, or .. .)?, 68 ECON. HIST. REV. 218 (2014).
173. Barry Eichengreen & Kris Mitchener, The Great Depression as a Credit Boom
Gone Wrong (Bank of Int'l Settlements Working Paper No. 137, 2003).
174. Joseph G. Haubrich, Nonmonetary Effects of Financial Crises: Lessons from the
Great Depression in Canada, 25 J. MONETARY ECON. 223 (1990).
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consistent with the much greater limits placed on Canadian banks to lend against
real estate.17 5 There is also related evidence that the more concentrated structure
of Canadian banking better facilitated implicit and explicit government
support.176
Finally, Canadian banks weathered the recent financial crisis far better than
their U.S. counterparts. 7 7 The key difference this time was less reliance on
wholesale sources of funding as opposed to deposits. This difference suggests
both a lower willingness and ability on the part of Canadian banks to rapidly
expand bank balance sheets through volatile sources of funding. Taken together,
both domestic and comparative evidence are consistent with the view that
increases in bank competition can result in excessive instability.
B. Public Choice on its Head
This body of theory and evidence suggests that we rethink the role of
restraints on competition in maintaining financial stability. The best way to
conceptualize this role is, ironically, to turn the public choice critique of
regulation on its head. Competitive restrictions in banking facilitated a banking
cartel. For each problem in the creation and maintenance of a cartel, these
restrictions offered a distinct legal, political, and economic solution. Recall the
cartel problems of establishing agreement, detecting deviations from that
agreement, and credibly punishing the deviations. The agreement was embedded
in federal statutes and rules. Detection by either private or public parties was
likely to lead to enforcement. Enforcement took place through both public
action formal and informal and private litigation.
In the absence of regulation, it is unlikely that the banking industry would
be able to maintain a cartel on anywhere near this scale. The impediments to
successful coordination would be high, even in the absence of antitrust and other
laws preventing explicit agreements. Regulation facilitated such coordination,
creating industry rents through controls on price, product, entry, and location.
These controls included deposit insurance, interest rate ceilings on deposits,
charter provisions, branching restrictions, and the separation of banking and
investment banking. In the case of deposits, for example, the evidence suggests
that banks would be unable to exercise significant market power in the absence
of facilitating regulation. The oligopoly problems of agreement and punishment
would be too difficult to solve. The agreements that regulation was able to
coordinate-through the Interest Rate Adjustment Act of 1966 were complex.
In the absence of public regulatory authority they would likely unravel. This is
illustrated by the historical example of NOW accounts. However, once these
175. Eichengreen & Mitchener, supra note 173.
176. Lawrence Kryzanowski & Gordon S. Roberts, Canadian Banking Insolvency,
1922-1940, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 361 (1993).
177. Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang, Why Are Canadian Banks More Resilient? (IMF
Working Paper No. 152, 2009).
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regulatory agreements were in place, banks were able and willing to inform
regulators of actions by competitors that threatened their cartel profits.
The rules and standards adopted were particularly suited to cartel
maintenance. Both oligopoly theory and empirical studies of actual cartels
suggest that detailed, ex ante agreements may be crucial for cartel stability.78
Defining the content of the agreement ex ante is also necessary to give industry
members the incentives to monitor the agreement and detect any deviations by
incumbents or entrants. Consistent with this insight, regulation utilized ex ante
rules to provide content to the restrictions that created rents for the industry. For
example, the Banking Act of 1933 prohibited the payment of interest "directly
or indirectly by any device whatsoever" on "any deposit which is payable by
demand."179
While the content of the agreement on deposit interest rates pay no
interest was defined through ex ante rules, the scope of the agreement was
defined through an ex post standard.'s The scope of the agreement required
defining a number of terms, such as "interest," "deposit," and "bank." These are
exactly the dimensions on which deviations from the price agreement were likely
to occur. The use of an ex post standard allowed the scope of the rule to expand
as new forms of substitutes emerged to take advantage of the profitable
opportunities created by the restrictions. If banks brought these substitutes to the
regulator's attention or if they were discovered in the examination process, the
regulator had the authority to prevent them. The use of standards also allowed
regulators to prevent entry from institutions that were outside the current scope
of regulatory authority. Neither regulators nor industry participants would have
been able to anticipate all possible forms of deviation from the agreement and
cover them exhaustively as rules in the regulation. Standards allowed new
information that arose after the passage of the law or regulation to inform
enforcement.
To illustrate, it would be difficult to find a better example of broad
regulatory authority to define deposits than the National Bank Act of 1935,
which established a prohibition on deposit interest for FDIC-insured banks. The
1935 Act defines "deposits" to include those "obligations of a bank as the
(FDIC's) board of directors shall find and shall prescribe by its regulations to be
deposit liabilities by general usage." The perfect circularity of this definition
allowed regulators to determine ex post whether any particular commercial
178. See generally ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF
COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS (2014) (describing the theoretical basis and empirical
evidence for detailed agreements in different cartel settings).
179. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
180. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992). In Kaplow's
framework, the difference between rules and standards is distinct from their complexity. Complexity
refers to the number and difficulty of the distinctions that a rule or standard makes. For every simple or
complex rule, there is at least in principle an equivalent (de facto) simple or complex standard. The
converse is also true. See Louis Kaplow, A Model ofthe Optimal Complexity ofLegalRules, 11 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 150 (1995).
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practice could have the effect of undermining the cartel profits that were built on
bank control of the deposit market.
Undoubtedly, these restrictions had a number of negative consequences for
both efficiency and distribution. For example, low deposit rates may have
distorted household savings decisions and likely resulted in a regressive transfer
of wealth from small depositors to bank equity holders. However, an important
caveat is that the most intractable market failures at least in banking are quite
distinct from that of price distortions through collective market power. As
described in Part I, these market failures are instead a result of the externalities
associated with the financial structure of banks. Theory and evidence suggest
that both market forces and public insurance create incentives for bank owners
and managers to take excessive risks, from a social point of view, on both the
asset and liability sides of the balance sheet.' What is perhaps less appreciated
is that regulators face many of the same limitations as market participants in
monitoring and deterring excessive risk taking by banks. These limitations place
a premium on regulatory tools that can limit bank risk taking without requiring
direct observation of bank risk.
Regulations that increase bank charter value are one such tool. Crucially,
they have the additional advantage that they can lower bank risk without
requiring regulators to directly observe and prevent it. Of course, the competitive
restrictions in New Deal regulation also created and maintained bank charter
value through regulatory-created market power. But few regulations exist that
do not also create costs along other dimensions. Regardless of whether this
system struck an appropriate balance between the benefits of risk reduction
against the costs of market power, it is important to recognize that such a tradeoff
exists and may be, at least in principle, a useful tool in the arsenal of
contemporary bank regulation. In at least this limited sense, the design-if not
the details-of the New Deal banking system is instructive.
It is also worth distinguishing when it may be appropriate to view
regulation-created rents as at least partly virtuous, rather than wholly vicious.
Public choice critics of regulation largely focused their attention on industries in
the transportation and telecommunication sectors, such as airlines, trucking,
railroad, and telephone. These industries often featured economies of scale,
barriers to entry, and oligopolistic market structures. According to these critics,
regulations exacerbated the very market failure market power that they were
designed to prevent. Far from limiting market power, regulation became a tool
of the industry to establish and maintain it.
To be clear, when social costs arise principally the problem of natural
monopoly for example, industries with increasing returns to scale that arise
from technology or network effects-regulation should be relatively more
concerned with limiting the ability of powerful firms to use their market power
181. See Mark J. Roe & Michael Troege, Containing Systemic Risk by Taxing Banks
Properly, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 181-83 (2018).
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to collude and exclude. As public choice critics have consistently argued, in the
context of natural monopoly, evidence that regulation enhances a cartel is often
evidence against the social value of regulation. This contrast with banking is
worth emphasizing, and may have been overlooked by public choice critics
because of their focus on industries other than banking. The theory of oligopoly
has seen its greatest value in introducing competition to exactly those
industries-e .g., transportation, telecommunications, and energy where
natural monopoly was thought to be an inescapable economic fact of life. It also
informs the core antitrust principles developed to detect and deter successful
cartel behavior in these same industries. However, in the context of bank
regulation, I suggest that oligopoly theory may sometimes be useful for creating
a legal, political, and economic architecture that facilitates, rather than frustrates,
cartels. I leave the possible application of this argument o other industries to
future work.
IV. Bank Regulation in the Shadow of Capital Markets
This Article has tried to describe how bestowing rents on banks helped to
create: (1) controls on risk taking and (2) limits on regulatory arbitrage. A
wholesale return to these past methods is neither feasible nor desirable. Banking
and financial markets have evolved, and statutorily-mandated price limits are
disfavored as a regulatory method. Nevertheless, it can be instructive to examine
past solutions, however imperfect, because risk and arbitrage continue to be two
of the central themes of bank regulation. In this Part, I outline a legal, political,
and economic (LPE) model that attempts to apply some of these insights from
the past to contemporary institutions and practices. I also identify some of the
major challenges that would be associated with this model. The principle behind
the model is straightforward. Banks should be allowed to issue comparatively
safe liabilities and be required to hold comparatively assets. In return, bank
should be able to adopt, within limits, liability structures that by their nature
create some systemic risk. Nonbanks should be required to offer issue liabilities
that pose little systemic risk and, in return, be allowed free rein to invest in assets.
How could such a model be put into practice? Capital, liquidity, and
maturity requirements could be set at much higher levels for existing, large bank
holding companies.'82 For example, regulation could target future aggregate
levels of capital of thirty percent and medium-to-long-term subordinated debt of
an additional thirty percent across all bank holding companies.'83 Similar
182. Small to medium-sized banks that are funded mostly by retail deposits would be
exempted. The size threshold for any particular institution is less important than the requirement that, in
the aggregate, these regulations cover most of the assets that are not funded through insured, retail
deposits. To facilitate coordination, it would also be important that the overall industry structure remain
largely oligopolistic.
183. Note that specifying such targets is distinct from the specifying the time by which
bank holding companies should attain these targets.
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requirements could exist for bank liquidity and maturity. In principle, this
corresponds to increasing the tax associated with highly leveraged, illiquid, and
maturity mismatched financial institutions. With such requirements in place, it
would take a much more substantial fall in asset values to threaten the stability
of the banking system. As a result, regulators' margin of error in assessing bank
risk would be much lower under this regime than under one of highly-leveraged
banks issuing wholesale, short-term debt to finance illiquid or potentially illiquid
assets.184
Of course, imposing onerous funding requirements on the largest bank
holding companies would create a competitive advantage for financial
intermediaries that are not subject to such requirements. Substantial amounts of
banking activity-defined as financial intermediation near the market's endpoint
on the continuum of credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation would
eventually move outside of bank holding companies. This is arbitrage outside
the regulated banking system. While such arbitrage opportunities are a natural
concomitant of any system of regulation, a heavy effective tax on aggregate
leverage among financial holding companies would require a more
comprehensive regulatory approach to this issue than is currently the case.'8 5
Such a change in regulatory emphasis may be welcome. It may be easier for
regulators to identify the migration of banking activity outside the regulatory
perimeter than to track subtle changes in the risk profile of highly-leveraged and
maturity-mismatched banks. Even when it is not, as explained below, it will be
in the interest of at least some regulated financial institutions to help inform
regulators of this migration.
Preventing arbitrage outside the regulatory perimeter requires, at a
minimum, that regulators be able to identify nonbanks that adopt liability
structures that are similar to banks. Here, existing bank regulation provides many
of the conceptual tools required for such an analysis. The same metrics that are
used to measure capital, liquidity, and maturity can be used to gauge whether a
nonbank poses similar risks to the existing set of banks. This is a comparative
exercise because it does not require a regulator to measure the level of risk
accurately. It would instead prevent nonbanks from being comparably risky on
the same measures. As a result, it would limit competition from nonbanks on
this, potentially pernicious dimension. Again, the capital, maturity, and liquidity
requirements for the largest bank holding companies can be set high enough to
ensure a large margin of error in this process.
To take a simple example, it is not difficult to determine that a special
purpose vehicle (SPV) that holds residential mortgages and issues short-term
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184. In principle, regulation could also specify standardized, underwriting requirements
for bank assets along the lines of what the Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) have done for
conformable mortgages. Government agencies are eminently capable of producing such standards.
185. For a related proposal, see Roe & Troege, supra note 181.
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commercial paper is functionally engaged in banking.'86 A real estate downturn
could easily trigger a run of redemptions against all such SPVs. 8 7 Measuring the
risk-weighted capital, liquidity coverage, and stable funding of an SPV under
Basel III would be no more or less complicated than examining the real estate
book of a bank. The composition of the SPV's assets mortgages and, by
inference, their likely correlation with the fate of mortgages held by banks in the
event of a downturn would be sufficient to establish the required similarity.
Focusing on the securitization structure also avoids having to distinguish
between different owners of securities. In this example, the SPV would be
classified as engaged in banking activity regardless of the investment vehicle that
ultimately held the commercial paper for example, a money-market mutual
fund, a short-term bond fund, or any other type of mutual, exchange-traded, or
pension fund."
The task of regulation would be to ensure that nonbanks, once identified,
could not operate with financial structures that allowed themselves to be funded
on more favorable terms than banks. In other words, a nonbank that held
financial assets should have at least as much capital, liquidity, and/or maturity as
a bank. In our securitization example, if an SPV funded itself by issuing bonds
then those bonds would need to have at least as long a weighted-average
maturity preferably, much longer than would be required of a
bank. Bondholders would also have limited rights to force asset sales by the SPV
in the event of nonpayment of interest. They would still have the ability to buy
and sell bonds and enter into interest rate swaps with other market participants.89
These market features would place a floor on any aggregate inefficiency that
might result from the liquidity premium that investors would have to pay.
Preventing regulatory arbitrage outside the banking system would require
a federal regulator-for example, the Federal Reserve-to have broad legal
authority to extend bank-like regulation to nonbank institutions and activities.
The regulator's goal would be to ensure that nonbank financial institutions that
may compete with banks on the asset side of the balance sheet have liability
structures that are considerably safer than banks. Nonbank institutions found to
186. Special purpose vehicles are bankruptcy-remote legal vehicles used to hold asset
backed securities. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133
(1994)
187. The risk that redemptions outside regulated banks could destabilize the financial
system does not turn on the size of any single SPV, but instead on the aggregate size of SPVs and their
linkages to the regulated banking system.
188. For an approach that would likely directly regulate such institutions, see RICKS,
supra note 28.
189. To make the model work, financial intermediaries in the derivative markets should
not be able to accumulate large, one-sided derivative positions. I thank Roberto Romano for bringing this
point to my attention. Existing derivative regulation is already moving in this direction. For sophisticated
analyses of derivative regulation in the Dodd-Frank Act, see Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, GEO. L.J. 2013, Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641 (2013), and Adam Levitin,JResponse: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives
Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445 (2013).
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pose these risks would be faced with the choice of funding themselves in a less
risky manner or to register as a bank holding company. This requires
supplementing the stringent capital, liquidity, and maturity requirements on
banks with even more stringent prohibitions on nonbank liabilities. In turn,
nonbanks would have much greater freedom with respect o the assets they hold.
These prohibitions could take the form of guidelines to nonbanks on how to
structure themselves to avoid registering as a bank holding company. It would
also require nonbanks to periodically disclose their financial structure to the
regulator and be subject to examination. Some institutions, such as securitization
vehicles, would by their nature be required to disclose, while the regulator could
retain broad power to request disclosures from other non-bank financial
institutions.
The legal, political, and economic structure of this regulatory model is
similar in a number of ways to the restrictions on competition that were once a
common in banking. First, the model creates a system of legal privileges and
prohibitions that govern the issuance of panic-prone debt.'90 Banking regulation
does so explicitly in the case of deposits. Banks have the exclusive legal privilege
of offering deposits. The analogy between deposits and panic-prone debt
suggests a legal framework for the latter that is also two-tiered, but not quite so
dichotomous.'9 ' Banks would have the privilege of being able to operate with
larger proportions of short-term, demandable debt than other financial
institutions holding comparable assets. Of course, banks are already subject to a
large set of regulatory prohibitions. Most importantly, they must maintain
minimum amounts of capital, liquidity, and maturity for their liabilities. The key
to turning these prohibitions into (relative) privileges is to subject competing
nonbanks to even more stringent regulation along each of these three dimensions.
Second, it makes use of ex ante rules and ex post standards to define the
scope of privileged and prohibited bank activities. Capital, liquidity, and
maturity requirements would be defined ex ante through administrative
rulemaking. The only difference is that they would be set at high enough levels
so as to shrink the banking sector.'92 Panic-prone debt would be defined through
an ex post standard. This standard must be flexible enough to adjust to
innovations that create the opportunity for regulatory arbitrage. It would not,
however, be unprincipled or unpredictable because it would be anchored in the
same regulatory measures used to regulate banks. The qualitative and
190. Id.
191. For a stimulating account of the dangers of regulation that can lead to excessive
herding and thereby create unintended system risk, see Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Anti-Herding
Regulation, 5 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1 (2015). For the usefulness ofregulation-induced herding to economic
analysis, see Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Bunching, 8 ANN. REV. ECON. 435 (2016). This approach was
pioneered in Emmanuel Saez, Do Taypayers Bunch at Kink Points?, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POLICY 180
(2010).
192. I thank Mark Perlow for the useful reminder that U.S. bank regulators often wish
to expand the size of the banking sector relative to the capital markets that are under the purview of the
SEC or the CFTC.
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quantitative definitions that apply to capital, liquidity, and maturity requirements
for bank holding companies would form the basis for deciding whether the
financial structure of nonbank competitors, either individually or in the
aggregate, posed any systemic risk.
Third, it creates a rent for banks that have the privilege of issuing panic-
prone debt in appreciable quantities. This rent arises because limiting the
aggregate quantity of such debt raises its price and, equivalently, lowers its
yield.'93 A shortage of such debt, relative to the socially excessive amount
demanded by the market, then results in lower funding costs for institutions that
can issue it in larger proportions. An aggregate limit on debt is analogous to the
explicit price controls on deposits that existed by statute. This quantity limit
would not only help correct the externality from the mispricing of panic-prone
debt, it would have the additional benefit of limiting bank incentives to take risk
without relying on regulators to precisely observe the risk. This regulatory model
would induce beneficial risk reduction within banks, over and above what can
be achieved through standardized underwriting, as a byproduct of its approach
to regulatory arbitrage.
Fourth and finally, this model enlists banks in regulatory enforcement.
Bank have a vested stake in any system that prevents competitors from taking
advantage of the capital, liquidity, and maturity requirements imposed on them.
As a result, they would have strong incentives to inform regulators and persuade
them to take action against nonbank competitors whose financial structures
indicated comparable levels of credit, liquidity, and maturity mismatch.
Regulators could develop a formal complaint procedure for banks to raise
concerns about regulatory arbitrage both outside and even within the regulated
banking sector, which would result in a cease and desist order. This mechanism
could be combined with private rights of action. Returning to our securitization
example, banks would be eager to inform regulators of the growth of
securitization vehicles that held similar assets but could be funded with greater
leverage and shorter maturity.
A final advantage of this model is that while its philosophy and key
regulatory parameters for capital, liquidity, and maturity may represent a
departure from existing regulation, its institutional structure does not. In fact, the
Dodd-Frank Act provides much of the regulatory architecture to implement the
model's goals of enhancing social stability. It does so in two principle ways.
First, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates enhanced prudential standards for the largest
bank holding companies.194 These include capital, liquidity, and maturity
193. See Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial-Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J.
ECON. 57 (2012) (developing a model in which monetary policy can effectively capping the amount of
short-term money creation); Robin Greenwood et al., The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet as a
Financial-Stability Tool, in JACKSON HOLE ECONOMIC SYMPOSIUM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 335
(2016) (arguing that monetary policy can enhance financial stability by increasing the slope of the short-
term end of the yield curve and thereby crowd out private money creation).
194. Dodd-Frank Act § 165 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2018)).
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requirements as well as a regime of supervisory and bank-run stress tests to
determine whether banks will be able to conform to these requirements in
adverse financial and economic conditions.195 Second, the Dodd-Frank Act
provides a regulatory process for the FSOC to designate nonbank financial
institutions as systemically important.196
Despite these similarities, the Dodd-Frank Act still falls short of
implementing the model described in this Part. For all the thousands of pages of
regulatory text devoted to specifying enhanced prudential standards, the largest,
most complex banks still qualify as adequately capitalized if they maintain a
leverage ratio of just four percent of common equity relative to average total
assets.197 As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act has not done enough to shrink the size
of banks relative to sources of long-term financing in the capital markets. Banks
appear to be much less leveraged when using regulatory measures that attempt
to assess the riskiness of a bank's assets.198 However, for any regulatory measure
of leverage that constrains a bank whether risk adjusted or not banks have
incentives to increase their asset risk in ways that are not observable to
regulators. If the past is any guide to the present, then banks currently have much
higher levels of risk than are measured through regulatory risk weights. This
mismatch between actual and measured risk is likely to increase over time as
banks better learn how to game the system. Arbitrage can occur both inside and
outside the regulated banking system.
The Dodd-Frank Act is particularly vulnerable to this kind of arbitrage.
Preventing it requires regulators to assess the aggregate risks imposed by large
and complex banks. This task, which is daunting enough on its own, is even more
challenging for the highly-leveraged, maturity-mismatched banks permitted by
the Dodd-Frank Act. At high levels of leverage, it is difficult for regulators to
gauge the many ways that banks can amplify their return on equity using
seemingly low risk assets. High leverage also implies that regulators have a thin
margin of error, so that small lapses in oversight can result in inefficiently large
tail or systemic risks. By continuing to allow bank holding companies to operate
in this manner, Dodd-Frank Act sets federal regulators a difficult, perhaps
impossible, task.
The designation process created through the Dodd-Frank Act also suffers
from a number of weaknesses.199 The FSOC is too fragmented in its decision-
making authority to permit a consistent and principled approach to designating
institutions on the basis of their aggregate activity. So far, the designation
195. Id.
196. Id. § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
197. 12 C.F.R. § 3.10 (2017)
198. Press Release, Fed. Res. Bd., Federal Reserve Board Releases Results of
Supervisory Bank Stress Tests (June 22, 2017), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases
/bcreg20l7O622a.htm [http://perma.cc/KP7K-GC7T].
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process for nonbank financial institutions has not adequately focused on
preventing arbitrage outside the regulated banking system.20 0 This is in part
because current prudential regulation has not been stringent enough to move this
activity outside banks. Under the model described above, the goal of prudential
regulation is to shrink the banking system relative to the capital markets and to
prevent the capital markets from recreating the same run risks that are found in
banking. In contrast, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the largest bank
holding companies have grown larger.20' There are undoubtedly a number of
legal, political, and policy questions embedded in the designation process. Here,
I limit myself to a few observations that are most directly relevant to the themes
developed in this Article.
With the exception of clearinghouses and other financial market utilities,
the FSOC has focused on individual institutions rather than aggregate markets.202
The FSOC did so even under the Obama Administration despite the fact that the
statutory language for its power to designate is broad,203 as is the language of the
FSOC's implementing regulations.204  The FSOC's focus on individual
institutions overlooks the fact that the aggregate or systemic implications of
many small entities engaging in regulatory arbitrage outside of the bank holding
company structure can be profound. Looking only to the size, complexity, or
interconnectedness of particular financial institutions can miss this mark.205 It is
more important to regulate the financial structure of the many securitization
vehicles creating the bonds that are bought by the largest insurance companies
or assets managers than it is to focus on the latter. For example, some forms of
regulation on asset managers, such as requiring money market funds to hold
more liquid and hence shorter-term assets can do more harm than good.206
200. To date, designation has largely focused on insurance companies. See Financial
Stability Oversight Council Designations, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives
/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank [http://perma.cc/V9PJ-SVS3].
201. Matt Egan, Too-Big-to-Fail Banks Keep Getting Bigger, CNN MONEY (Nov. 21,
2017, 3:43 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/11/21/investing/banks-too-big-to-fail-jpmorgan-bank-of-
america/index.html [http://perma.cc/MFQ4-NVU9].
202. Financial Stability Oversight Council Designations, supra note 200.
203. Dodd-Frank Act § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2018)).
204. 12 C.F.R. § 1310.11 (2017)
205. This is not to suggest, for example, that he Federal Reserve should not have better
access to proprietary data on the risks posed by large insurers. The experience ofAIG during the financial
crisis shows that derivative trading can leave large banks exposed to the counterparty risk from the failure
of a large insurer. Those risks are important for bank regulators to understand, but hey nevertheless
originated ultimately from mortgage risk on bank balance sheets that were hedged using derivatives. For
further analysis of the designation of insurance companies, ee Schwarcz & Zaring, supra note 67.
206. Non-government money market funds overwhelmingly hold debt that is issued by
banks. The net effect of such liquidity requirements for funds may well be to shorten the maturity of bank
debt. In 2012 for example the top fifty global banks accounted for about ninety percent of money market
fund assets that were not explicitly backed by the government. Perspectives on Money Market Mutual
FundReforms: Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urb. Aff, 112th Cong. 126 (2012) (statement
of David S. Scharfstein, Professor, Harv. Bus. Sch.). Again, this is not to suggest that a regulator like the
Federal Reserve with a mandate to limit systemic risk should not seek information from such funds. Such
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The FSOC's approach has, to date, not designated any entity that could be
labeled a competitor of banks engaging in what I have called arbitrage outside
the system.207 One reason is the focus on individual institutions mentioned
above. Just as important, however, are the relatively weak capital, liquidity, and
maturity limits established by the Dodd-Frank Act. These requirements were not
strong enough to prompt any substantial outflow of activity from the regulated
banking system. For example, the current outstanding volume of asset-backed-
commercial paper (ABCP) stands at a little over $200 billion.208 This is one third
of the volume outstanding in 2001, when the Federal Reserve first started to track
this aggregate.209 There are of course a number of reasons behind the decline in
securitization activity in aftermath of the financial crisis, but it is noteworthy
how little recovery there has been in this market despite the overall recovery of
stock and other asset prices. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that if bank
capital, liquidity, and maturity regulation were much more stringent, it would
eventually push more financial intermediation into the capital markets through
securitization. ABCP would be an obvious form of arbitrage around prudential
regulation. The task of designation should be to regulate ABCP structures to
prevent this from taking place. Currently, the most salient regulatory barrier to
greater securitization activity are the Dodd-Frank's risk retention requirements,
which are best understood as a weak constraint.2 10
To summarize, the Dodd-Frank Act does not go far enough in its capital,
liquidity and maturity requirements for bank holding companies, and it has not
adopted a coherent framework to force financial intermediation into the capital
markets while preventing the migration of banking risks outside the regulated
banking system. The legal, political, and economic model outlined above would
push the Dodd-Frank Act forward on each of these dimensions. It does, however,
raise a number of important concerns. Here, I highlight some of the major
objections to implementing such a model. I first consider whether the model
would have negative consequences for financial intermediation and investment.
I then consider whether it would be feasible to implement. Both of these
concerns are valid, and no defense of this model can fully allay them. But this is
true for any particular model of financial regulation. I reserve a full articulation
the model outlined here and its inevitably partial defense to future work.
requests could be an important channel through which the regulator learns of fund investments in
securitization or other vehicles that are essentially operating like banks
207. Insurance companies do not fall under this definition to the extent that their sources
of funding are relatively stable.
208. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding, FED. REs. BANK ST. Louis (Mar.
15, 2018), http://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ABCOMP [http://perma.cc/JSQ8-D7CH]. When the
underlying assets are mortgages, asset-backed commercial paper represents an extreme form of maturity
transformation because the maturity of the commercial paper is typically between ninety and one hundred
and eighty days.
209. Id.
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A fundamental objection to this model is that the capital, liquidity, and
maturity requirements proposed for banks and, in addition, for nonbank
competitors would be too severe. It can be argued that such requirements would
cripple financial intermediation and, as a result, curtail economic output and
growth. However, as I and others have suggested elsewhere, these concerns are
overblown in the context of banking activity that could and does readily take
place through long-term, stable sources of funding in the capital markets.?" Put
simply, banks are just one set of institutions that conduct financial
intermediation. This objection also loses much of its force when these
requirements are phased in gradually and predictably over a number of years.212
In fact, these requirements may spur socially valuable innovation.213
Historically, limitations on U.S. banks may have played an important role in the
growth and deepening of U.S. capital markets.2 14 In what directions might
innovation take place today? It is possible that the current demand for liquid,
short-term financial claims by household and institutions is as much a function
of path dependence and outmoded institutions as it is of real demands for
liquidity.215 For the wealthy households that hold most of the aggregate financial
wealth in the economy, there is no need to have any assets in transaction
accounts.216 A single financial account with the household's optimal portfolio
could readily act as both an investment vehicle and source of liquidity to make
payments. That portfolio would be constructed with an eye to risk as opposed to
liquidity because most financial securities can be readily sold. A number of
companies already offer services that come close to this description.2 17
Moreover, for the non-financial firms that account for a large fraction of money-
like, short-term financial instruments, these holdings may not be in their
211. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKER'S NEW CLOTHES: WHAT'S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2014); Anat Admati et al, Fallacies and Irrelevant
Facts in the Discussion of Capital Regulation, in CENTRAL BANKING AT A CROSSROADS: EUROPE AND
BEYOND 33 (Charles Goodhart ed., 2014); Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 HARv. Bus. L.
REV. 1 (2014); John H. Cochrane, Equity-Financed Banking and a Run-Free Financial System, Address
at Ending Too Big to Fail: Federal Reserve Bank of Minnesota Symposium (May 16, 2016),
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/run-freetalk mn_2016.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T3WV-QSTY].
212. Krishnamurthy, supra note 211.
213. For a general account of how regulation can foster innovation, see Paul Joskow &
Nancy Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (R.
Schmalensee and R.D. Willig ed., 1989). For a more critical perspective of the role that regulation should
and should not play in financial innovation, see Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation,
HARV. Bus. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); and E. Glen Weyl & Eric Posner, An FDA for Financial
Innovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to21st Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. L. REV.
1307 (2013).
214. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, COMPARING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
(2001) (describing how market-based financial intermediation became more dominant in the United States
and United Kingdom relative to Germany and Japan).
215. Cochrane, supra note 211; John Cochrane, Finance: Function Matters Not Size,
27 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (2013).
216. See id.
217. These include companies like Wealthfront and Betterment.
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shareholders' interest. After all, if the cash was returned to shareholders it would
not be reinvested in such low-risk securities. As a result, current levels of
institutional cash holding may represent an agency cost as opposed to socially
optimal liquidity levels for investment and payment purposes.
For these reasons, it may be that much of the inherent run risk in the current
financial structure of banks is actually unnecessary. Financial deepening and
innovation could make this even more true over time. In light of this possibility,
it is not surprising that the banking industry would cling to the benefits of an
outmoded model. A central assumption of the model of regulation outlined here
is that the regulated banking sector is currently too large and should shrink even
more as a fraction of the financial sector over time. There is no way to
demonstrate this convincingly to a confirmed skeptic, but debates over regulation
at this scale are more adequately described by burden shifting than by standards
of proof. The case against the existing size and organization of the banking
system is strong enough, both in my view and that of more seasoned observers,
to shift the burden of proof to the banking industry.
Of course, even if it is conceded that such a legal, political, and economic
model of regulation would be desirable, there are a number of challenges that it
would face in its implementation. First, regulators would need to determine
appropriate levels of capital, liquidity, and maturity requirements for bank
holding companies and, perhaps more importantly, the transition path to
achieving these levels. It would be disruptive to require bank holding companies
to make dramatic changes to their liability structure in a short period of time. It
would instead be more feasible to mandate a transition path over a decade or
more. Specifying a set of gradual, mandatory increases on each of these
dimensions makes the calculation of an ultimate level less important.
Second, regulators would need to issue guidance for nonbank competitors
of banks to ensure that they operated with levels of capital, liquidity, and
maturity that were substantially higher than those permitted for banks. This
guidance would need to enable institutions to organize their finances while
preserving regulatory flexibility to deal with innovative practices. Specifying
new targets and a transition path for already existing regulatory requirements
does not require much in the way of regulatory innovation relative to the current,
Basel-based system. Nevertheless, extending bank regulation beyond bank
holding companies would continuously raise issues concerning the application
of these Basel concepts to new forms of financial organization. But regulators
must eventually face these issues anyway, and they are not insurmountable.
Moreover, there can be considerable margin for error in this process of quasi-
designation, unlike the process of accurately assessing the risks of highly-levered
financial institutions. The relationship between the risks of banking panics and
the volume of credit, maturity, and liquidity mismatch in nonbank financial
institutions is highly nonlinear. The risk only becomes appreciable at sufficient
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scale.2 18 As a result, regulators need only an approximate understanding of the
effective size of the banking system. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that
the political challenges of implementation exceed their purely technocratic ones.
That said, the political challenges to implementation would be formidable,
and are unlikely to be overcome until or unless a new financial crisis emerges
that reveals the weakness of the existing regulatory structure.219 Even in the latter
case the political obstacles would remain. Bank holding companies have already
adjusted to the Dodd-Frank regime of prudential regulation and stress testing.
They are already starting to make inroads on relaxing leverage requirements, and
they would vigorously oppose any increase in other capital, liquidity, or maturity
requirements.22 Similarly, the extension of Federal Reserve oversight to
nonbank financial companies has been vigorously contested in the courts.22' The
FSOC is unlikely to clarify its authority in this area because the political capital
for further expansion of the regulatory umbrella has been spent.222 That capital
account is better described as in arrears than surplus. Currently, there is no
prospect that SIFI designation will be extended to the asset management
industry. Even in a different political environment, the asset management
industry's natural regulatory ally would be the SEC. Regardless of party control,
the SEC will generally be suspicious of ceding regulatory jurisdiction to the
Federal Reserve.
These domestic challenges are compounded in the international sphere.
Domestic bank holding companies generally insist that any increase in capital,
liquidity, or maturity requirements above the international floor set by Basel will
disadvantage them vis a vis their foreign competitors. The likelihood that these
increases could be accomplished solely through the Basel process is dim. There
are too many countries with predominantly bank-based financial systems where
the contemplated increases would substantially impede the provision of credit.
The possibility of capital market substitution is what provides U.S. regulation
with unique opportunities. At least some international coordination would be
required for enforcement. Extending banking regulation to nonbank competitors
like securitization vehicles or investment trusts would create pressure for some
of that activity to locate abroad. This arbitrage would take place in the countries
218. I thank Dan Farber for bringing this point to my attention.
219. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy ofDodd-Frank: Why FinancialReform
Tends to be Frustrated & Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1020 (2012); Adam J. Levitin,
The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991
(2014). For an opposing view emphasizing the iron-clad limits of post-crisis regulation, see Roberta
Romano, Regulating in the Dark and a Postscript Assessment of the Iron Law of Financial Regulation,
43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 25 (2014).
220. Jesse Hamilton, Fed Working on Proposal to Ease Up on Bank Leverage Limits,
BLOOMBERG POL. (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-19/fed-
said-to-be-finishing-proposal-to-ease-up-on-bank-leverage [http://perma.cc/5B2Z-96ER].
221. John Heltman, FSOC Gives Up Effort to Designate MetLife as SIFI, AM. BANKER
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with capital market activity that was deep enough to absorb these financial flows,
and domestic regulation would not have the power to prevent it.
There is still a case to be made that, at least in principle, the United States
could go it alone. The restrictions that were placed on banks in the aftermath of
the Great Depression likely facilitated, rather than restricted, the development of
U.S. capital markets. They provided benefits in the form of a protected market
for deposits and price controls, but they also prohibited commercial banks from
participating in investment banking. The model of regulation described here
would help the safety and profitability of the banking sector, but it would also
limit its size and encourage the institutional development of market-based
substitutes that could more readily absorb risk without triggering panic.
I have thus far described largely technical and institutional obstacles that
would prevent the implementation of this model. Another possibility is that, once
passed through the filter of politics, its implemention would have largely
pernicious consequences. Banks could shape the regulatory process so to prevent
the entry and expansion of nonbank competitors. They could eventually neuter
the implementation of any heightened prudential standards and grow both
proportionally larger and panic prone over time. Implicit subsidies provided as a
byproduct of an effective regulatory tax could be turned explicit, reinforcing the
idea that large banks are too big to fail. This could set banks on a path similar to
the GSEs, as government subsidies come to support ever riskier lending practices
over time.223 Alternatively or additionally, nonbanks could be the beneficiaries
of failures to prevent the large-scale migration of banking activity outside of
bank holding companies. A shadow-banking sector of highly-levered and
maturity-mismatched financial intermediaries could emerge that serves as
ground zero, again, for a future crisis.
All this is to say that there is no model of regulation, existing or untried,
that cannot be rendered completely ineffective or turned into a corrupt caricature
of itself in the right political circumstances. Still, any given model can be
described as more or less consistent with an expected legal, political, and
economic equilibrium. In a polity with consistent left to right swings of some
amplitude, more aggressive regulatory measures in one political cycle can prove
destabilizing if undone with little forethought in the next. This is the lesson of
aggressive deregulation followed by crisis. The model described here could,
however, appeal to different political constituencies and therefore temper these
swings. It features a much more aggressive approach to regulating banks, but
does so with the intent of replacing banks with less risky forms of intermediation
through the financial markets. As described, if the model were to be adopted and
then abandoned, assuming the political cycles that have marked banking
223. For an explanation of the financial crisis that emphasizes the role of the GSEs, see
PETER J. WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE WORLD'S WORST FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (2016).
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regulation over the last several decades, it would mean no worse than reverting
to the status quo. The political dynamics of the present, however, provide no
such guarantees.
Conclusion
This Article has attempted to reinterpret and reassess key aspects of the
history of bank regulation from standpoint of the present. It starts with what are
broadly recognized as two of major weaknesses of prudential bank regulation in
its current form: risk monitoring and regulatory arbitrage. Understanding past
regulatory practices is useful if it can inform these two contemporary issues. The
restrictions on price, product, entry, and location that were features of New Deal
bank regulation had well understood costs, but in hindsight we can better
appreciate some of their benefits. Ironically, these benefits are best understood
by viewing regulation through the lens of public choice theory.
Public choice theory, in its strongest form, views regulation through the
lens of industry rent seeking. The entire legal, political, economic structure of
regulation can be explained as means of helping an industry to solve its cartel or
oligopoly coordination problem. In the case of natural monopolies, a close fit
between public choice theory and empirical practice may be damning. However,
the case of banking may be different. In banking, competitive restrictions created
rents that curbed bank incentives for risk taking and enlisted banks in limiting
the issuance of deposit-like claims outside the regulatory banking sector.
I outline one of many possible models of prudential regulation that relies
on this insight. This model would subject bank holding companies to stringent
enough capital, liquidity, and maturity requirements to lower the aggregate yield
on short term bank debt. It would subject nonbanks to even more aggressive
requirements on each of these dimensions and utilize banks in the enforcement
of this limitation on would-be competitors.
In general, it is often the task of regulation to limit the quantity of an
externality-producing good in an environment where regulators face a number
of monitoring and enforcement constraints. In such environments, it may be
useful to create a legal privilege through which the price benefits of the quantity
limitation redound to a set of privileged institutions. Such a rent would normally
give those so privileged, as well as their unlucky competitors, an economic
incentive to expand output. Expanding output, however, undermines the
effectiveness of regulation. This tendency can be balanced through a legal and
political architecture that enables the privileged to collectively prevent such an
expansion from occurring.
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